《经济学人》:中国崛起的危险(翻译贴,较长)

楼主:NileBlue 时间:2010-12-15 12:34:00 点击:88019 回复:598
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英国的《经济学人》杂志在今年12月2日出版的一期上,有一篇题为
《中国崛起的危险》文章,并附有一共分六部分的长篇特别报道。
主要分析的是当今中国的对外关系,其中重点是中美关系。由于这篇
文章及特别报道涵盖的面较广,包括的观点比较多,所以可以将之
看做西方对中国外交关系这个问题上的一篇综述。所以我想翻译出来,
  与诸位共享。
  该文及报道都未署名,可能是《经济学人》编辑部集体撰写的。
  
  我昨天问了一下,似乎大家还是主张英文原文和中文译文一起列出,
  所以下面也照此办理。
  译文中的(),有些是原文就有的,有些是比较重要的概念,所以我
  用()引用了原文。
  译文中的【】都是我加入的话,不属于原文。有些是因为我认为原文
  的意思不完整,加入一些话才能说清楚。有些是我写的一些注释,
  有些是我加的一些评论。
  
  译文一共3万多字,比较长。希望诸位有耐心看完。
  翻译中的错误肯定是很多的,也请诸位随时指出。
  
  

《经济学人》原文插图

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作者:午夜三更 时间:2010-12-15 12:38:47
  太好了。昨前天到处找全版的都没有。
  
  谢谢楼主,支持个先
作者:数字哥 时间:2010-12-15 12:43:33
  ddd
作者:rockface 时间:2010-12-15 12:59:33
  mark一下。
楼主NileBlue 时间:2010-12-15 13:10:32
  原文链接:http://www.economist.com/node/17629709
  
  The dangers of a rising China
  China and America are bound to be rivals, but they do not have to be antagonists
  中国崛起的危险
  中、美注定要成为竞争对手,但他们不必成为敌人
  
  
  TOWARDS the end of 2003 and early in 2004 China’s most senior leaders put aside the
  routine of governing 1.3 billion people to spend a couple of afternoons studying the rise of
  great powers. You can imagine history’s grim inventory of war and destruction being laid
  out before them as they examined how, from the 15th century, empires and upstarts had
  often fought for supremacy. And you can imagine them moving on to the real subject of
  their inquiry: whether China will be able to take its place at the top without anyone
  resorting to arms.
  2003年底和2004年初,中国的最高层领导者们把管理13亿人的日常工作放在一边,花了
  几个下午研究大国的崛起。你可以想象,当他们审视自15世纪以来,帝国和暴发户是怎样
  争夺霸权的时候,历史的阴森记忆中那些战争和毁灭在他们徐徐面前展开。你也可以想象他
  们进而提出真正的问题:在没有人诉诸武力的情况下,中国能否登上世界之巅。
  
  In many ways China has made efforts to try to reassure an anxious world. It has repeatedly
  promised that it means only peace. It has spent freely on aid and investment, settled
  border disputes with its neighbours and rolled up its sleeves in UN peacekeeping forces
  and international organisations. When North Korea shelled a South Korean island last
  month China did at least try to create a framework to rein in its neighbour.
  在许多方面,中国已经做出努力,试图让焦急的世界安下心来。它已经反复承诺它的意图只
  有和平。它已经在援助和投资上投入巨资;它致力于解决与邻国的边界争端;它还鼓足干劲
  参加联合国维和部队以及其它国际组织。当朝鲜上个月炮击韩国的一个小岛时,中国至少尝
  试建立一个框架来驾驭它的邻居。
  
  But reasonable China sometimes gives way to aggressive China. In March, when the North
  sank a South Korean warship, killing 46 sailors, China failed to issue any condemnation. A
  few months later it fell out with Japan over some Chinese fishermen, arrested for ramming
  Japanese coastguard vessels around some disputed islands—and then it locked up some
  Japanese businessmen and withheld exports of rare earths vital for Japanese industry. And
  it has forcefully reasserted its claim to the Spratly and Paracel Islands and to sovereignty
  over virtually the entire South China Sea.
  但是,讲道理的中国有时会让位给好斗的中国。3月,朝鲜击沉一艘韩国军舰,造成46名
  水兵死亡,中国没有发表任何谴责。几个月后,它又和日本翻脸,为的是一些中国渔民在有
  争议的岛屿附近冲撞了日本海岸警卫队的船只,并遭到逮捕——这时中国抓了一些日本商
  人,并暂停了对于日本工业至关重要的稀土的出口。它还强烈重申了对于西沙群岛、南沙群
  岛、进而几乎整个南中国海的主权。
  
  As the Chinese leaders’ history lesson will have told them, the relationship that determines
  whether the world is at peace or at war is that between pairs of great powers. Sometimes,
  as with Britain and America, it goes well. Sometimes, as between Britain and Germany, it
  does not.
  中国领导人的历史课肯定已经告诉了他们:强国之间的关系决定了世界是处于和平还是战
  争。有时一切顺利,如英国和美国。有时则剑拔弩张,如英国和德国。
  
  So far, things have gone remarkably well between America and China. While China has
  devoted itself to economic growth, American security has focused on Islamic terrorism and
  war in Iraq and Afghanistan. But the two mistrust each other. China sees America as a
  waning power that will eventually seek to block its own rise. And America worries about
  how Chinese nationalism, fuelled by rediscovered economic and military might, will express
  itself (see our special report).
  到目前为止,中、美之间一切都非常好。当中国致力于经济增长时,美国的安全重心聚焦在
  伊斯兰恐怖主义,以及在伊拉克和阿富汗的战争上。但双方彼此互不信任。中国认为美国是
  一个衰落中的强国,最终会试图阻止自己的崛起。而美国则担心在新的经济实力、军事实力
  刺激下的中国民族主义,将如何行动(见我们的特别报告)。
楼主NileBlue 时间:2010-12-15 13:12:32
  The Peloponnesian pessimists
  “一山不容二虎”派悲观主义者
  
  Pessimists believe China and America are condemned to be rivals. The countries’ visions of
  the good society are very different. And, as China’s power grows, so will its determination
  to get its way and to do things in the world. America, by contrast, will inevitably balk at
  surrendering its pre-eminence.
  悲观主义者认为中、美注定要成为对手。两国各自构想的“理想社会”差距太大。而且,随
  着中国实力的成长,它会越来越坚定地按自己的方式处理国际事务,达到自己的目的。相比
  之下,美国也不可避免地不愿意放弃它的领导地位。
  
  They are probably right about Chinese ambitions. Yet China need not be an enemy. Unlike
  the Soviet Union, it is no longer in the business of exporting its ideology. Unlike the
  19th-century European powers, it is not looking to amass new colonies. And China and
  America have a lot in common. Both benefit from globalisation and from open markets
  where they buy raw materials and sell their exports. Both want a broadly stable world in
  which nuclear weapons do not spread and rogue states, like Iran and North Korea, have
  little scope to cause mayhem. Both would lose incalculably from war.
  关于中国的野心,他们也许是对的。然而中国不需要敌人。与苏联不同,它不再输出它的意
  识形态。与19世纪的欧洲列强不同,它不想征服新的殖民地。中、美有着许多共同之处。
  它们都受益于全球化,也受益于它们购买原材料、出售商品的开放市场。它们都需要一个非
  常稳定的世界:核武器受到控制、像伊朗和朝鲜这样的“无赖国家”几乎没有惹事的机会。
  它们在战争中的损失都是无法估量的。
  
  The best way to turn China into an opponent is to treat it as one. The danger is that spats
  and rows will sour relations between China and America, just as the friendship between
  Germany and Britain crumbled in the decades before the first world war. It is already
  happening in defence. Feeling threatened by American naval power, China has been
  modernising its missiles, submarines, radar, cyber-warfare and anti-satellite weapons. Now
  America feels on its mettle. Recent Pentagon assessments of China’s military strength warn
  of the threat to Taiwan and American bases and to aircraft-carriers near the Chinese coast.
  The US Navy has begun to deploy more forces in the Pacific. Feeling threatened anew,
  China may respond. Even if neither America nor China intended harm—if they wanted only
  to ensure their own security—each could nevertheless see the other as a growing threat.
  把中国当成敌人,最可能的结果就是中国真地变成了敌人。危险在于一些小摩擦会破坏中、
  美之间的关系,就像德国和英国之间的友谊在第一次世界大战前的几十年里逐渐破裂一样。
  在国防问题上,这种情况已经发生了。由于中国觉得受到了美国的海军力量的威胁,它已经
  更新了自己的导弹、潜艇、雷达、网络战和反卫星武器。现在轮到美国感觉不对劲了。五角
  大楼最近的中国军事力量评估里,警告了针对台湾、针对美国的基地、针对紧靠中国海岸的
  美军航母的威胁。美国海军已经开始在太平洋上部署更多的部队。再次感受到新的威胁,中
  国可能做出新的反应。即使美国或者中国都没有恶意——如果它们都只想保证自己的安全的
  话——它们仍然将对方视为一个日益增长的威胁。
  
  Some would say the solution is for America to turn its back on military rivalry. But a weaker
  America would lead to chronic insecurity in East Asia and thus threaten the peaceful
  conduct of trade and commerce on which America’s prosperity depends. America therefore
  needs to be strong enough to guarantee the seas and protect Taiwan from Chinese attack.
  有人会说解决的办法是让美国放弃军事的对抗。但是一个削弱的美国将导致东亚局势逐渐走
  向紧张,进而威胁到美国的繁荣所依赖的和平的商业、贸易活动。美国因此需要强大得足以
  保证海洋安全,并能保护台湾免遭中国的攻击。
  【译者注:整篇文章中,作者几乎一直用China和Taiwan来称呼海峡两岸,实际上这是在
  暗示China不包括Taiwan。其实,在讨论有关两岸的问题时,应该使用Mainland和Taiwan。
  为了保证连贯性,我一律将作者使用China的地方译成“中国”。后文同此,大家看时请注
  意。】
楼主NileBlue 时间:2010-12-15 13:14:17
  How to take down the Great Wall
  如何拆掉长城
  
  History shows that superpowers can coexist peacefully when the rising power believes it
  can rise unhindered and the incumbent power believes that the way it runs the world is not
  fundamentally threatened. So a military build-up needs to be accompanied by a build-up of
  trust.
  历史表明,当崛起的大国相信自己的崛起并没有受到阻碍的时候、当居统治地位的大国相信
  自己管理世界的方式并没有受到本质性的威胁的时候,那么超级大国是可以和平共处的。所
  以伴随着军事力量的增长,需要的是信任的增长。
  
  There are lots of ways to build trust in Asia. One would be to help ensure that disputes and
  misunderstandings do not get out of hand. China should thus be more open about its
  military doctrine—about its nuclear posture, its aircraft-carriers and missile programme.
  Likewise, America and China need rules for disputes including North Korea (see article),
  Taiwan, space and cyber-warfare. And Asia as a whole needs agreements to help prevent
  every collision at sea from becoming a trial of strength.
  在亚洲建立信任有许多的方法。其中一个是确保纠纷和误解不至于超出控制。中国的军事方
  针应该更加透明——核武器的立场、航母以及导弹计划。同样,美国和中国需要在包括朝鲜
  (见后文)、台湾、外层空间和网络战等方面建立一些准则。另外,亚洲作为一个整体,需
  要建立一些协议来防止海上的摩擦演变为军事力量的角逐。
  
  America and China should try to work multilaterally. Instead of today’s confusion of
  competing venues, Asia needs a single regional security forum, such as the East Asia
  Summit, where it can do business. Asian countries could also collaborate more in
  confidence-boosting non-traditional security, such as health, environmental protection,
  anti-piracy and counter-terrorism, where threats by their nature cross borders.
  美国和中国应该试着开展多边工作。不同于今天的混乱的局面,亚洲需要一个单一的地区安
  全论坛,比如东亚峰会,一个可以谈正事的地方。亚洲国家也可以共同致力于可以增加互信
  的非传统安全领域,比如健康、环保、反盗版和反恐,这些威胁从其本质上来说就是跨国界
  的。
  
  If America wants to bind China into the rules-based liberal order it promotes, it needs to
  stick to the rules itself. Every time America breaks them—by, for instance, protectionism—it
  feeds China’s suspicions and undermines the very order it seeks.
  如果美国想把中国带入到自己所倡导的有规矩的自由秩序中,美国自己就需要遵守这些规
  矩。每次美国打破规矩——比如保护主义——这就增加了中国的怀疑,也破坏了它所寻求的
  秩序。
  
  China and America have one advantage over history’s great-power pairings: they saw the
  20th century go disastrously wrong. It is up to them to ensure that the 21st is different.
  中、美有一个历史上的那些强国所没有的优势:它们看到了混乱不堪的20世纪。现在轮到
  它们来确保21世纪将不会重蹈覆辙。
作者:大海真大啊 时间:2010-12-15 13:15:24
  先占前排
楼主NileBlue 时间:2010-12-15 13:16:30
  原文链接:http://www.economist.com/node/17601499
  
  A special report on China’s place in the world
  Brushwood and gall
  China insists that its growing military and diplomatic clout pose no threat. The rest of the
  world, and particularly America, is not so sure, says Edward Carr
  关于中国在世界上的地位的特别报告(一)
  卧薪尝胆
  中国坚称其日益增强的军事和外交影响力并不构成威胁。世界上的其他国家,尤其是美国,
  对此不太确信。——爱德华•卡尔
  【译者注:Edward Carr是《经济学人》杂志的现任编辑,主管国际方面。】
  
  
  IN 492BC, at the end of the “Spring and Autumn” period in Chinese history, Goujian, the
  king of Yue in modern Zhejiang, was taken prisoner after a disastrous campaign against
  King Fuchai, his neighbour to the north. Goujian was put to work in the royal stables where
  he bore his captivity with such dignity that he gradually won Fuchai’s respect. After a few
  years Fuchai let him return home as his vassal.
  492 BC,在中国历史上的“春秋”末期,统治着今天浙江的越王勾践,在一次进攻他北方
  的邻居夫差王的战役中遭到惨败,从而被俘。勾践被迫供职于王家马厩,但即使在囚禁生活
  中,勾践也保持着自己的尊严,他逐渐赢得了夫差的尊敬。几年之后,夫差放他回家,勾践
  成了他的附庸。
  
  Goujian never forgot his humiliation. He slept on brushwood and hung a gall bladder in his
  room, licking it daily to feed his appetite for revenge. Yue appeared loyal, but its gifts of
  craftsmen and timber tempted Fuchai to build palaces and towers even though the
  extravagance ensnared him in debt. Goujian distracted him with Yue’s most beautiful
  women, bribed his officials and bought enough grain to empty his granaries. Meanwhile, as
  Fuchai’s kingdom declined, Yue grew rich and raised a new army.
  勾践绝没有忘记自己的屈辱。他睡在柴草上,在自己的房间里悬挂了一个胆囊,每天他舔一
  下苦胆,激发自己报仇的决心。越国表面上是忠诚的,但它进贡的工匠和木材诱使夫差大兴
  土木,建造宫殿楼阁,奢侈的生活让他负债累累。勾践用越国最美丽的女人分散他的注意力、
  收买他的官员、买空了他的谷仓。与此同时,当夫差的王国日益衰落时,越国则兴旺起来并
  召集了新的军队。
  
  Goujian bided his time for eight long years. By 482BC, confident of his superiority, he set
  off north with almost 50,000 warriors. Over several campaigns they put Fuchai and his
  kingdom to the sword.
  勾践用了8年的时间等来了他的机会。到了482 BC,充满信心的他带着50,000勇士向北进
  军。几次战役之后,他征服了夫差和他的王国。
  
  The king who slept on brushwood and tasted gall is as familiar to Chinese as King Alfred
  and his cakes are to Britons, or George Washington and the cherry tree are to Americans.
  In the early 20th century he became a symbol of resistance against the treaty ports,
  foreign concessions and the years of colonial humiliation.
  对于中国人来说,勾践卧薪尝胆的故事就像阿尔弗雷德大王和他的饼对于英国人、乔治•华
  盛顿和樱桃树的故事对于美国人那么熟悉。在20世纪初,他象征着对通商口岸、租界和多
  年的殖民地的屈辱的反抗。
  【译者注:阿尔弗雷德大王是公元9世纪英格兰南部的一个国王,因顽强抵抗丹麦人入侵而
  成为英国历史上唯一的“大王”——Alfred the Great。他和饼的故事讲的是有一次他兵败后,
  隐姓埋名躲藏在一个农妇家。农妇出门时让他看着炉子上正在烤的饼,他却沉浸在自己的思
  绪中,结果饼烤糊了。】
  
  Taken like that, the parable of Goujian sums up what some people find alarming about
  China’s rise as a superpower today. Ever since Deng Xiaoping set about reforming the
  economy in 1978, China has talked peace. Still militarily and economically too weak to
  challenge America, it has concentrated on getting richer. Even as China has grown in power
  and rebuilt its armed forces, the West and Japan have run up debts and sold it their
  technology. China has been patient, but the day when it can once again start to impose its
  will is drawing near.
  这样一来,勾践的故事集中了一些人对于今天中国崛起为超级大国感到不安的因素。自从
  1978年邓小平开始经济改革,中国一直在谈和平。当在军事上和经济上尚无力挑战美国的
  时候,它一直把力量集中在自身的富强。甚至到了中国的力量已经成长起来,也重建了自己
  的武装力量的今天,西方和日本却陷入债务,并把它们的技术卖给它。中国一直都很有耐心,
  但它再次开始将自己的意志强加给别人的那一天就快要到了。
  
  However, Goujian’s story has another reading, too. Paul Cohen, a Harvard scholar who has
  written about the king, explains that the Chinese today see him as an example of
  perseverance and dedication. Students are told that if they want to succeed they must be
  like King Goujian, sleeping on brushwood and tasting gall—that great accomplishments
  come only with sacrifice and unyielding purpose. This Goujian represents
  self-improvement and dedication, not revenge.
  然而,勾践的故事还有另一个解读。一位曾经为勾践写过专著的哈佛大学学者保罗•科恩【中
  文名柯文】,解释说今天的中国视他为坚韧和决心的榜样。学生们被告知:如果他们想要成
  功,他们必须像勾践王那样卧薪尝胆——伟大的成就必须伴随着牺牲和坚持不懈。这样的勾
  践就代表着自我完善和决心,而不是复仇。
  
  Which Goujian will 21st-century China follow? Will it broadly fit in with the Western world,
  as a place where people want nothing more than a chance to succeed and enjoy the
  rewards of their hard work? Or, as its wealth and power begin to overshadow all but the
  United States, will China become a threat—an angry country set on avenging past wrongs
  and forcing others to bend to its will? China’s choice of role, says Jim Steinberg, America’s
  deputy secretary of state, is “the great question of our time”. The peace and prosperity of
  the world depends on which path it takes.
  21世纪的中国会跟从哪一个勾践?它是否能广泛地融入西方世界,在这里人们想要的只是
  一个让他们成功的机会,并享受他们的辛勤工作的回报?又或者,当它的财富和权势开始超
  过除美国外的所有国家,中国是否会成为一个威胁——一个愤怒的国家开始清算过去的冤
  屈,并强迫他人屈服于它的意志?美国副国务卿吉姆•施泰贝格说,中国选择哪个角色是“当
  今时代的重大问题”。世界的和平与繁荣取决于它走哪条道路。
  
  Some people argue that China is now too enmeshed in globalisation to put the world
  economy in jeopardy through war or coercion. Trade has brought prosperity. China buys
  raw materials and components from abroad and sells its wares in foreign markets. It holds
  $2.6 trillion of foreign-exchange reserves. Why should it pull down the system that has
  served it so well?
  有些人认为中国现在已沉浸在全球化中,不愿通过战争及威压陷全球经济于危险。贸易已带
  来繁荣。中国通过海外市场购买原材料和部件、出口其产品。它拥有2.6万亿美元的外汇储
  备。它为什么要推翻一个对自己如此有利的系统呢?
  
  But that is too sanguine. In the past integration has sometimes gone before conflagration.
  Europe went up in flames in 1914 even though Germany was Britain’s second-largest
  export market and Britain was Germany’s largest. Japan got rich and fell in with the
  European powers before it brutally set about colonising Asia.
  但是这太过乐观。历史上,有时候融合之后也会发生对抗。尽管当时德国是英国的第二大出
  口市场,英国是德国最大的出口市场,1914年的欧洲仍然陷入战火。日本变得富强而且和
  欧洲列强称兄道弟之后,却开始了在亚洲的残酷征服。
  
  Others go to the opposite extreme, arguing that China and America are condemned to be
  enemies. Ever since Sparta led the Peloponnesian League against Athens, they say,
  declining powers have failed to give way fast enough to satisfy rising powers. As China’s
  economic and military strength increase, so will its sense of entitlement and its ambition.
  In the end patience will run out, because America will not willingly surrender leadership.
  其他人则走向另一种极端,认为中国和美国注定要成为敌人。自从斯巴达领导伯罗奔尼撒同
  盟对抗雅典以来,他们说,衰落中的强国让出自己地位的速度,总是无法让崛起中的强国满
  意。伴随着中国经济和军事力量的增涨,它将越来越体会到自己的权势和野心。到最后中国
  的耐心将耗尽,因为美国不会自愿交出领导权。
楼主NileBlue 时间:2010-12-15 13:22:32
  Reasons for optimism
  乐观的原因
  
  But that is too bleak. China clings to its territorial claims—over Taiwan, the South China Sea,
  various islands and with India. Yet, unlike the great powers before 1945, China is not
  looking for new colonies. And unlike the Soviet Union, China does not have an ideology to
  export. In fact, America’s liberal idealism is far more potent than token Communism,
  warmed-up Confucianism or anything else that China has to offer. When two countries
  have nuclear weapons, a war may not be worth fighting.
  但这样的场景太凄凉了。中国确实一直在坚持自己的领土要求——台湾、南中国海、一些岛
  屿以及与印度的接壤地区。然而,与1945年以前的强国不同,中国没有寻求新的殖民地。
  另外,不同于苏联,中国没有输出一种意识形态。事实上,美国的自由理想主义(liberal
  idealism)远比沦为口号的共产主义、复兴起来的儒学或者中国主张的其它一切学说都要影
  响深远。当两个国家都拥有核武器的时候,战争也许就不值得一打了。
  
  In the real world the dealings between rising and declining powers are not straightforward.
  Twice Britain feared that continental Europe would be dominated by an expansionary
  Germany and twice it went to war. Yet when America took world leadership from Britain,
  the two remained constant allies. After the second world war Japan and Germany rose
  from the ashes to become the world’s second- and third-largest economies, without a
  whisper of a political challenge to the United States.
  在现实世界中,崛起的强国和衰落的强国之间的交往,并不是直截了当的。英国两次担心欧
  洲大陆受制于扩张的德国,并且两次进入战争。然而,当美国取代了英国的世界领导地位之
  后,这两国一直保持着盟友关系。第二次世界大战结束后,日本和德国从废墟上成长为世界
  上第二、第三大经济体,却没有发出一点在政治上挑战美国的窃窃私语。
  
  International-relations theorists have devoted much thought to the passing of empires.
  The insight of “power-transition theory” is that satisfied powers, such as post-war
  Germany and Japan, do not challenge the world order when they rise. But dissatisfied ones,
  such as pre-war Germany and Japan, conclude that the system shaped and maintained by
  the incumbent powers is rigged against them. In the anarchic arena of geopolitics they
  believe that they will be denied what is rightfully theirs unless they enforce their claim.
  国际关系学家们花了很多心思研究帝国的消涨。“权力转移理论”(power-transition theory)
  的重点是:要求得到满足的强国,如战后德国和日本,它们崛起时不会挑战世界的秩序。但
  要求没有得到满足的强国,如战前德国和日本,会认定构建、维持国际格局的统治大国,正
  在背后算计它们。在无法无天的地缘政治舞台上,它们相信除非诉诸武力,它们是不会得到
  本应属于自己的东西的。
  
  So for most of the past decade the two great powers edged towards what David Lampton,
  a professor at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, calls a double
  wager. China would broadly fall in with America’s post-war order, betting that the rest of
  the world, eager for China’s help and its markets, would allow it to grow richer and more
  powerful. America would not seek to prevent this rise, betting that prosperity would
  eventually turn China into one of the system’s supporters—a “responsible stakeholder” in
  the language of Robert Zoellick, a deputy secretary of state under George Bush junior and
  now president of the World Bank.
  所以,约翰•霍普金斯大学高等国际关系研究所的大卫•兰伯顿教授认为,在过去十年的大
  部分时间里,两个大国正在慢慢形成他称之为“双赌”(double wager)的局面。中国将广
  泛地融入美国的战后秩序,赌的是由于世界其它国家渴望中国的帮助和中国的市场,将允许
  中国变得富强。美国将不会寻求阻止中国的崛起,赌的是繁荣将最终把中国变成一个秩序的
  支持者——按曾在小乔治•布什总统政府中担任副国务卿、现任世界银行总裁的罗伯特•佐
  利克的话说就是“负责任的利益相关方”(a responsible stakeholder)。
  
  For much of the past decade, barring the odd tiff, the wager worked. Before 2001 China
  and America fell out over Taiwan, the American bombing of China’s embassy in Belgrade
  and a fatal mid-air collision between an American EP3 spy plane and a Chinese fighter.
  Many commentators back then thought that America and China were on a dangerous
  course, but Chinese and American leaders did not pursue it. Since then America has been
  busy with the war on terror and has sought plain dealing with China. American companies
  enjoyed decent access to Chinese markets. China lent the American government huge
  amounts of money.
  过去十年中的大多数时候,除了一些小争吵,这个双赌奏效了。2001年以前,中、美在台
  湾问题上闹僵、美国轰炸中国驻贝尔格莱德大使馆,以及美国EP3间谍飞机和一架中国战
  斗机发生致命的空中相撞。当时许多分析人士认为美国和中国正处在一个危险的轨道上,但
  中国和美国的领导人并不追求危险。从那时起美国一直在忙于反恐战争,对于中国一直采取
  平稳的态度。美国公司在中国市场享受着还算不错的份额。中国还借给美国政府大量的钱。
  
  This suited China, which concluded long ago that the best way to build its “comprehensive
  national power” was through economic growth. According to its analysis, articulated in a
  series of white papers and speeches in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the country needed
  a “New Security Concept”. Growth demanded stability, which in turn required that China’s
  neighbours did not feel threatened.
  对于中国这样很好,它很久以前就认定建设其“综合国力”的最好方法就是通过经济增长。
  经90年代末期、00年代初期的一系列白皮书和演讲的表述,根据这种分析,国家需要一种
  “新安全观”。增长要求稳定,这反过来要求中国不让它的邻国觉得受到了威胁。
  
  To reassure them, China started to join the international organisations it had once shunned.
  As well as earning it credentials as a good citizen, this was also a safe way to counter
  American influence. China led the six-party talks designed to curb North Korea’s nuclear
  programme. The government signed the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty and by and large
  stopped proliferating weapons (though proliferation by rogue Chinese companies
  continued). It sent people on UN peacekeeping operations, supplying more of them than
  any other permanent member of the security council or any NATO country.
  为了使它们安心,中国开始加入以前拒绝加入的国际组织。这样一方面让它获得了一个好公
  民的信誉,一方面也是一种安全的对抗美国影响力的方法。中国领导了旨在抑制朝鲜核计划
  的六方会谈。政府签署了《全面禁止核试验条约》,总的说来它致力于阻止核武器的扩散(虽
  然一些“无赖”中国公司仍在继续扩散)。它为联合国维和行动出力,提供的人员比其他任
  何安理会的常任理事国或任何北约国家都要多。
  【译者注:作者在这里把中国加入《全面禁止核试验条约》写成似乎是一种为了安抚别人而
  做出的姿态。实际上,中国一直参与了该条约的谈判,1996年9月24日,中国继东道主
  美国之后,是第二个在条约上签字的国家。作为对比,当年联大表决时,印度对该条约投了
  反对票,并至今没有加入该条约。】
  
  Inevitably, there were still disputes and differences. But diplomats, policymakers and
  academics allowed themselves to believe that, in the nuclear age, China might just emerge
  peacefully as a new superpower. However, that confidence has recently softened. In the
  past few months China has fallen out with Japan over a fishing boat that rammed at least
  one if not two Japanese coastguard vessels off what the Japanese call the Senkaku Islands
  and the Chinese the Diaoyu Islands.
  不可避免地,还有纠纷和分歧。但外交官、决策人士和学者们已经开始相信,在核时代,中
  国可能会和平地崛起为一个新的超级大国。然而,近来信心削弱了。过去的几个月中,为了
  一艘中国渔船在日本称为尖阁列岛、中国称为钓鱼岛附近与一艘(也许两艘)日本海岸警卫
  队船只相撞的事件,中国和日本闹翻了。
  
  Earlier, China failed to back South Korea over the sinking of a Korean navy corvette with the
  loss of 46 crew—even though an international panel had concluded that the Cheonan was
  attacked by a North Korean submarine. When America and South Korea reacted to the
  sinking by planning joint exercises in the Yellow Sea, China objected and got one of them
  moved eastward, to the Sea of Japan. And when North Korea shelled a South Korean island
  last month, China was characteristically reluctant to condemn it.
  早些时候,当韩国海军的反潜舰被击沉并有46名船员丧生时,中国没有支持韩国——尽管
  国际调查组认定“天安号”遭到了一艘朝鲜潜艇的攻击。当美国和韩国针对沉船事件,计划
  在黄海进行联合军演时,中国表示反对,迫使部分军演转移到了东面的日本海。当朝鲜上个
  月炮击韩国的一个岛屿时,中国一如既往地不愿表示谴责。
  
  China has also begun to include territorial claims over large parts of the South China Sea
  among its six “primary concerns”—new language that has alarmed diplomats. When
  members of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) complained about this in
  a meeting in Hanoi in the summer, China’s foreign minister, Yang Jiechi, worked himself
  into a rage: “All of you remember how much of your economic prosperity depends on us,”
  he reportedly spat back.
  中国也开始把囊括大部分南中国海的主权要求包括在它的六个“首要问题”当中——这是一
  种让外交官们警惕的新的语言。当东南亚国家联盟(ASEAN)的成员今年夏天在河内的一个
  会议上抱怨这一点的时候,中国外交部长杨洁篪装模作样地发起怒来,据报道他不屑地说:
  “你们都要记住你们的经济繁荣在多大程度上依赖于我们。”
  
  Last year a vicious editorial in China’s People’s Daily attacked India after its prime minister,
  Manmohan Singh, visited disputed territory near Tibet; Barack Obama was shabbily
  treated, first on a visit to Beijing and later at the climate-change talks in Copenhagen,
  where a junior Chinese official wagged his finger at the leader of the free world; Chinese
  vessels have repeatedly harassed American and Japanese naval ships, including the USS
  John S. McCain and a survey vessel, the USNS Impeccable.
  去年,中国的《人民日报》在一篇社论中恶毒地攻击印度总理曼莫汉•辛格,因为他访问了
  西藏附近的争议领土。巴拉克•奥巴马遭到了无礼的待遇,先是在北京的访问中,后来在哥
  本哈根关于气候变化的讨论中,当时一个中国下级官员对着自由世界的领袖摇动着指头;中
  国船只一再骚扰美国和日本的军舰,包括美国海军的“约翰•S•麦凯恩”号,以及“无暇”
  号勘测船。
  【译者评:称美国总统为“自由世界的领袖”,多年不见的典型的冷战语言。】
  
  Such things are perhaps small in themselves, but they matter because of that double bet.
  America is constantly looking for signs that China is going to welsh on the deal and turn
  aggressive—and China is looking for signs that America and its allies are going to gang up
  to stop its rise. Everything is coloured by that strategic mistrust.
  这样的事也许是小事,但由于那个“双赌”所以它们变得很重要。美国总在寻求迹象表明中
  国正在逃避责任,变得富有侵略性——而中国正在寻求迹象表明美国和它的盟友将联合起来
  阻止其崛起。在战略性的互不信任中,一切都被渲染放大了。
  
  Peering through this lens, China-watchers detect a shift. “The smiling diplomacy is over,”
  says Richard Armitage, deputy secretary of state under George Bush. “China’s aspiration
  for power is very obvious,” says Yukio Okamoto, a Japanese security expert. Diplomats,
  talking on condition of anonymity, speak of underlying suspicions and anxiety in their
  dealings with China. Although day-to-day traffic between American and Chinese
  government departments flows smoothly, “the strategic mistrust between China and the
  US continues to deepen,” says Bonnie Glaser of the Centre for Strategic and International
  Studies in Washington, DC.
  通过这个现象,关注中国的人们发现了一个转变。“微笑的外交已经结束了”,曾在乔治•布
  什政府中担任副国务卿的理查德•阿米蒂奇如是说。“中国对强权的渴望是很明显的”,一位
  日本安全专家冈本行夫如是说。一些不愿透露姓名的外交官谈起了在与中国打交道时的潜在
  的怀疑和焦虑。虽然美国和中国的政府部门间的日常交流很顺利,“中、美之间的战略性的
  不信任仍然在加深”,华盛顿的战略与国际问题研究中心的伯尼•格莱塞如是说。
  
  There is nothing inevitable about this deterioration. Peace still makes sense. China faces
  huge problems at home. It benefits from American markets and good relations with its
  neighbours, just as it did in 2001. The Chinese Communist Party and the occupant of the
  White House, of any political stripe, have more to gain from economic growth than from
  anything else.
  这样的恶化不是不可避免的。和平仍然是有道理的。中国面临着很多巨大的国内问题。它从
  美国市场和良好的邻国关系上都受益匪浅,一如2001年的时候。中共和白宫的主人,不论
  他的政治背景如何,都能从经济增长中获得比其它方面更多的利益。
  
  China’s leaders understand this. In November 2003 and February 2004 the Politburo held
  special sessions on the rise and fall of nations since the 15th century. American
  policymakers are no less aware that, though a powerful China will be hard to cope with, a
  dissatisfied and powerful China would be impossible.
  中国领导人理解这个。2003年11月到2004年2月,中央政治局专门讨论自15世纪以来
  的大国兴亡。美国的决策者同样意识到,尽管强大的中国会很难应付,但一个不满而又强大
  的中国,那是不堪忍受的。
  
  Now, however, many factors, on many sides, from domestic politics to the fallout from the
  financial crisis, are conspiring to make relations worse. The risk is not war—for the time
  being that remains almost unthinkable, if only because it would be so greatly to everyone’s
  disadvantage. The danger is that the leaders of China and America will over the next
  decade lay the foundations for a deep antagonism. This is best described by Henry
  Kissinger.
  然而,现在有许多因素,在许多方面,从国内政治到金融危机的影响,一起促使两国关系恶
  化。危险不在于战争——战争目前仍然是不可想象的,只因为它会极大地损害每一方的利益。
  危险在于中、美的领导人可能在今后的十年中逐渐为以后的敌对关系打下基础。关于这一点,
  亨利•基辛格描述得最好。
楼主NileBlue 时间:2010-12-15 13:24:14
  The dark side
  黑暗面
  
  Under Richard Nixon, Mr Kissinger created the conditions for 40 years of peace in Asia by
  seeing that America and China could gain more from working together than from
  competing. Today Mr Kissinger is worried. Speaking in September at a meeting of the
  International Institute for Strategic Studies, he observed that bringing China into the global
  order would be even harder than bringing in Germany had been a century ago.
  在理查德•尼克松的指导下,基辛格为亚洲40年的和平创造了条件,因为他看到相比起竞
  争,美国和中国在合作中能获得更多的东西。今天基辛格变得担心了。2007年9月,在国
  际战略研究协会的一次会议上,他认为将中国引入到国际秩序中,比起一个世纪前引入德国
  要困难得多。
  
  “It is not an issue of integrating a European-style nation-state, but a full-fledged
  continental power,” he said. “The DNA of both [America and China] could generate a
  growing adversarial relationship, much as Germany and Britain drifted from friendship to
  confrontation…Neither Washington nor Beijing has much practice in co-operative relations
  with equals. Yet their leaders have no more important task than to implement the truths
  that neither country will ever be able to dominate the other, and that conflict between
  them would exhaust their societies and undermine the prospects of world peace.”
  “问题在于:不同于吸纳一个欧州的民族国家,【中国是】一个羽翼丰满的大陆强国,”他说:
  “双方(美国和中国)的DNA将产生一种日益敌对的关系,就像德国和英国从友好转为对
  抗……华盛顿和北京都没有什么与一个与自己平起平坐的强国合作的经验。但是双方的领导
  人最重要的工作还是传达这样一个事实:两国中任何一个都不可能主宰对方,而且它们之间
  的冲突将耗尽自己的社会,并破坏世界和平。”
  
  Nowhere is the incipient rivalry sharper than between America’s armed forces and their
  rapidly modernising Chinese counterparts. Globally, American arms remain vastly superior.
  But in China’s coastal waters they would no longer confer such an easy victory.
  初期的对抗中,最尖锐对抗的发生在美国武装力量与迅速现代化的中国武装力量之间。从全
  球范围来看,美国的军力依然具有强大的优势。但在中国沿海水域,它们将不再有轻松的胜
  利。
楼主NileBlue 时间:2010-12-15 13:25:59
  原文链接:http://www.economist.com/node/17601475
  
  A special report on China’s place in the world
  Less biding and hiding
  China is becoming more nationalistic and more assertive. How will other countries react?
  关于中国在世界上的地位的特别报告(二)
  少些等待,少些躲藏
  中国正逐渐变得越来越民族主义、越来越自信。其它国家将如何反应?
  
  
  “WHO is your enemy?” It was a fine Beijing day in early summer this year. In the seminar
  room on the campus of Peking University one of a delegation of visiting American
  academics posed the question to Wang Jisi, dean of the School of International Studies.
  There was a moment’s silence. Mr Wang hesitated before looking up and replying: “Most
  Chinese would say the US is the enemy.”
  “谁是你们的敌人?”那是今年夏天北京的一个晴天。在北京大学内的一个研究室中,来访
  的美国学者代表团中的一位成员向国际关系学院的王缉思院长提出了这个问题。片刻的沉
  默。王先生犹豫了一下回答说:“大多数中国人会说美国是敌人。”
  
  And yet, as Robert Ross sets out in his book, “Chinese Security Policy”, America and China
  have had a remarkably productive partnership since President Richard Nixon and Henry
  Kissinger turned up in Beijing in 1972. At first this was based on a shared antagonism
  towards the Soviet Union, which China had fought in border clashes in 1969. Under Mao,
  China had often bullied its neighbours, but had now subordinated this part of its foreign
  policy because co-operation with America was more important. Under Deng Xiaoping,
  Mao’s eventual successor, China even reluctantly accepted America’s continuing arms sales
  to Taiwan.
  然而,正如罗伯特??罗斯在他的《中国安全政策》一书所说:自从理查德??尼克松总统和亨
  利??基辛格在1972年访问北京以来,美国和中国已经形成了一种卓有成效的合作关系。一
  开始这是基于共同对抗苏联——中、苏曾于1969年在两国边境发生冲突。在毛的领导下,
  中国经常欺负它的邻国,但现在这种政策已被搁置,因为与美国的合作更为重要。在毛泽东
  最终的接班人邓小平的领导下,中国甚至勉强接受了美国继续向台湾出售武器。
  
  When the Soviet threat evaporated, China continued to put foreign policy second—this
  time for the sake of economic development. Again, that required co-operation with
  America, the best source of demand, technology and investment. Deng summed up the
  policy in a famous slogan: “Coolly observe, calmly deal with things, hold your position, hide
  your capacities, bide your time, accomplish things where possible.” When the world began
  to worry about China’s surging power, a senior official tried to calm fears, pledging a
  heping jueqi (peaceful rise). Even that had to be watered down, as the jue in “rise”
  suggests “towering as a peak”. These days Hu Jintao, China’s leader, prefers the
  deliberately bland “harmonious world”.
  当苏联的威胁不复存在之后,中国继续把外交政策放在第二位——这一次是为了发展经济。
  这又需要与美国的合作——最好的需求、技术和投资的来源。邓小平曾把这种政策归结为著
  名的口号:“冷静观察、沉着应付、稳住阵脚、韬光养晦、有所作为。”当世界开始担心中国
  急速增长的实力时,一位高级官员试图打消这种恐惧,保证将“和平崛起”。甚至连这个口
  号也放弃了,因为“崛”有成为“群山之巅”的暗示。现在,中国喜欢用
  故意温和的“和谐世界”。
  
  Over the years China’s leaders have worked hard to steer relations with America through
  their inevitable crises. By and large, they have succeeded. Now China’s behaviour—most
  recently towards Japan, South Korea and the South China Sea—has begun to alarm
  China-watchers. Yet why would the country’s leaders suddenly risk undermining a policy
  that has brought China such prosperity?
  在过去的几年里,中国领导人一直努力避免他们与美国的关系上发生不可避免的危机。总的
  来说,他们成功了。最近,中国的行为——最主要的是针对日本、韩国和南中国海——开始
  让关注中国的人士感到警惕。然而,为什么这个国家的领导人会突然冒险破坏给中国带了如
  此繁荣的政策呢?
  
  There are two possible reasons. One is that China’s strategy has begun to change. Some
  Chinese argue that, now their country is strong, it no longer needs to kowtow to American
  power. The other is that Chinese society itself has begun to change. In what Richard Rigby,
  of the Australian National University in Canberra, calls “a fragmented authoritarian
  one-party state”, the leaders need to listen more closely to what other people think.
  有两个可能的原因。一个是中国的策略已经开始改变。一些中国人认为,现在他们的国家强
  大了,不再需要讨好美国。另一个是中国社会本身也开始改变。位于堪培拉的澳大利亚国立
  大学的理查德??里格比将这种情况称之为“一个分化的一党制集权国家”,领导人需要更仔
  细地倾听他人的想法。
楼主NileBlue 时间:2010-12-15 13:28:11
  If we can, we will
  如果能够的话,我们会的
  
  Start with China’s changing strategy. China has a keen sense of its growing national power
  and American decline, sharpened by the financial crisis, which uncovered flaws in America
  and Europe and found China to be stronger than many had expected. “There is a
  perception in China that the West needs China more than China needs the West,” says one
  diplomat in Beijing. America’s difficult wars have added to the impression. According to
  Raffaello Pantucci, a visiting scholar at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, Chinese
  analysts “gleefully” conclude that NATO forces will lose in Afghanistan.
  先从中国改变策略说起。中国已经敏锐感觉到自身实力的增长和美国的衰落,金融危机加深
  了这一印象,因为它暴露了美国和欧洲的缺陷,而危机中的中国比许多人预计的更为强大。
  一位在北京的外交官说:“在中国有一种看法:西方需要中国超过中国需要西方”。美国举步
  维艰的战争也加深了这一印象。据在上海社会科学院做访问学者的拉菲罗•庞图奇说,中国
  分析家们“高兴地”得出这样的结论:北约部队将在阿富汗失败。
  
  “We used to hide our power—deny our power,” a Chinese scholar told David Lampton of
  the School of Advanced International Studies in Washington. “But then this became
  increasingly impossible as our strength increased.” For a time this led to redoubled efforts
  to reassure America and the region. But today, according to Yuan Peng, of the China
  Institutes of Contemporary International Relations in Beijing, “many Chinese scholars
  suggest that the government give up the illusion of US partnership and face squarely the
  profound and inevitable strategic competition.”
  “我们过去隐藏自己的实力、否认自己的实力”,一位中国学者对位于华盛顿的高等国际关
  系研究所的大卫•兰伯顿说:“但是这么做变得越来越不可能,因为我们的实力在增长。”曾
  有一段时间这种情况导致中国用加倍的努力来安抚美国和周边地区。但是今天,正如位于北
  京的现代国际关系研究院的袁鹏所说:“许多中国学者建议政府放弃与美国合作的幻想,直
  接正视深刻且不可避免的【与美国的】战略竞争。”
  
  China’s desire to assert itself springs from a natural appetite. A rising country is like a diner
  sitting down to a full table: until he starts eating, he does not realise how hungry he is.
  “Power changes nations,” writes Robert Kagan, an American foreign-policy commentator.
  “It expands their wants and desires, increases their sense of entitlement, their need for
  deference and respect. It also makes them more ambitious. It lessens their tolerance to
  obstacles, their willingness to take no for an answer.”
  中国想维护自己的权益,产生这种渴望是很自然的。一个正在崛起的国家就像一位在盛宴上
  落座的食客:除非他开始吃,否则他不知道自己有多么饿。“实力改变了国家”,一位美国外
  交政策评论家罗伯特•科冈写道:“实力刺激了它们的需求和欲望,实力增加了它们的权利,
  也增加了它们对服从与尊重的需要。这也让它们更野心勃勃。实力减少了它们对阻碍的容忍,
  也减少了它们接受挫折的意愿。”
  
  China has been good at suppressing that appetite, but it also has growing reasons to
  project power. Chinese companies are scouring the globe for the raw materials they need.
  Already China is Saudi Arabia’s biggest customer. It imports about half of the oil it burns, a
  share that will rise to two-thirds by 2015 and four-fifths by 2030. China cares what
  happens in the countries that supply it.
  中国一贯擅长抑制这种渴望,但它也有日益增多的理由来发挥自己的实力。中国公司现在在
  全球范围内搜寻它们需要的原料。中国已经是沙特最大的客户。它所使用的石油大约有一半
  需要进口,这个比例到2015年将上升到三分之二,到2030年将上升到五分之四。中国关
  注在原料供应国发生的事情。
  
  An irony not lost on Kurt Campbell, America’s assistant secretary of state, is that China’s
  strategy of acquiring natural resources has so far been based on what he calls “an
  operating system” provided by the United States—which guarantees stability and the free
  flow of maritime traffic. One reason why China is now building an ocean-going navy is to
  protect its raw materials and goods from embargoes.
  对于美国助理国务卿柯特•坎贝尔来说,颇有讽刺意味的是中国获得自然资源的策略到目前
  为止仍然基于一种他所称的由美国提供的“操作系统”——美国保证了海上交通的稳定性和
  物资的自由流动。这是中国现在正在建造远洋海军的原因之一:来保护它的原材料和货物免
  遭封锁的威胁。
  
  This reflects a lack of faith in the global trading system, part of an underlying fear that the
  West is fundamentally hostile to China’s prosperity—“Westernising, dividing and
  weakening”, as the slogan goes. Jonathan Paris, a London-based security specialist, says
  young Chinese are disenchanted by what they see as Western China-bashing. Some
  influential groups think that foreign calls for China to be a “responsible stakeholder” are in
  fact designed to keep the country down, and that it should co-operate only if the West
  makes concessions on issues such as Taiwan and Tibet.
  这反映出对全球贸易体系的信心不足,部分原因是一种潜在的恐惧:西方从根本上是敌视中
  国的繁荣的——正如谚语所说“西化、分化、弱化”。乔纳森•巴里斯,一家总部在伦敦的
  安全专家说,中国的青年把西方对中国的批评看作一种敌视,从而对西方感到失望。一些有
  影响力的团体认为外国呼吁中国成为一个“负责任的利益相关方”,实际上只是为了让中国
  失望;只有当西方愿意在诸如台湾和西藏等问题上让步的时候,才应该与西方合作。
  
  The question is whether China’s leaders agree that now is the time to assert the country’s
  power. The apex of Chinese politics is so closed to the world that analysts cannot be sure.
  In 2009 Mr Hu said China could “actively” make modest contributions to international
  issues. On their annual summer retreat, at the resort of Beidaihe, the country’s leaders
  reportedly debated whether China should edge away from Deng’s “bide and hide” slogan.
  Some influential party journals that may reflect the leaders’ thinking have concluded, “not
  yet”. However, even that position strikes some diplomats as a shift. In the 1990s the
  argument was about whether China could work with America in the long run. Now it is
  about when to apply pressure.
  问题在于中国领导人是否认为现在是时候去发挥国家的实力。中国政治的顶端对于世界来说
  是那么封闭,分析家们无法确定这个问题的答案。2009年,胡锦涛说中国将“积极地”参
  与国际问题,作出力所能及的贡献。在旅游胜地北戴河,这个国家领导人每年的避暑地,据
  报道领导人正在讨论是否逐渐放弃邓小平的“等待并隐藏”的口号。一些能够反映出领导人
  的思想的、有影响力的党内记者已经总结出了结论:“还不会”。然而,即使这个立场也让一
  些外交家感到是一种变革。20世纪90年代的争论是关于中国能否和美国一起长期地发展。
  现在的争论是什么时候中国应该施加压力。
  
  Whatever the leaders think, they are operating in a society that is changing rapidly. These
  days they are more influenced by a new set of foreign-policy interests, including resource
  companies, financial institutions, local government, research organisations, the press and
  online activists. Linda Jakobson and Dean Knox of the Stockholm International Peace
  Research Institute (SIPRI), who have studied these groups, say many of them feel strongly
  that China should be “less submissive” towards the outside world.
  无论领导人怎么想,他们管理的这个社会正在发生迅速的变化。近年来他们都受到一整套新
  的外交政策利益相关方的影响,包括资源公司、金融机构、地方政府、研究机构、媒体以及
  网上的激进者。斯德哥尔摩国际和平研究所(SIPRI)的琳达•雅各布森和迪安•诺克斯研
  究了这些团体,说他们中许多人坚信中国对于外面的世界应该“更少屈从”。
  
  Such people’s assertiveness partly reflects the patriotism that the government encouraged
  in order to prop up its legitimacy after it brutally put down the protests in Tiananmen
  Square in 1989. First came a weekly flag-raising ceremony with a rousing address in every
  school. Next, museums and relics were designated “patriotic education bases”. In 1991
  Jiang Zemin, then general secretary, wrote that patriotic education “let the Chinese people,
  especially the youth, enhance their pride and self-confidence in the nation and prevent the
  rise of the worship of the West”.
  这些人的自信有部分原因是爱国主义得到政府的鼓励,借以在1989年残酷镇压天安门广场
  抗议者之后,支撑其合法性。首先,每个学校每周都有升旗仪式以及一场令人振奋的演说。
  其次,博物馆和遗迹被指定为“爱国主义教育基地”。1991年,当时的总书记江泽民写道:
  爱国主义教育“让中国人,特别是年轻人,增强了他们对民族的自豪感和自信心,而不是盲
  目崇拜西方。”
作者:非洲的西庇阿 时间:2010-12-15 13:28:33
  先Mark!
楼主NileBlue 时间:2010-12-15 13:29:11
  The rise of nationalism
  民族主义的兴起
  
  The first generation to get that treatment is now nearing its 30s, and its nationalism shows
  every sign of being genuine and widespread. “On Tibet and Taiwan it’s not just Chinese
  ministers who bang tables,” says Lord Patten, who negotiated the handover of Hong Kong
  from Britain to China, “but Chinese dissidents, too.” “This is a people with a sense of their
  past greatness, recent humiliation, present achievement and future supremacy,” says Mr
  White, the former Australian security and defence official. “It’s a potent mix.”
  在这种情况下成长起来的第一代人现在大约30多岁,他们身上的民族主义迹象是真实而多
  样的。“在西藏问题和台湾问题上,不光是中国的部长们在拍桌子”,曾经谈判把香港从英国
  治下交还给中国的帕顿勋爵【即Chris Patten,中文名彭定康】说:“拍桌子的还有中国的
  异议人士”。“这样的人民身上肩负着过去的辉煌、近代的屈辱、现在的成就以及未来的无上
  地位”,怀特先生,一位前澳大利亚安全和国防官员说:“这是一个强有力的组合。”
  
  China’s more commercial media have found that nationalism sells. According to Susan
  Shirk, an American academic and former deputy assistant secretary of state, readers like
  stories complaining about Japan, Taiwan and America—and the censors are usually happy
  to see coverage of such things. SIPRI found that the most influential journalism on foreign
  policy appears in the Global Times, which is written by hardline nationalists.
  一些更为商业化的中国媒体则发现民族主义有助销量。根据一位美国学者、前副助理国务卿
  苏珊•谢克的研究,【中国】读者们喜欢反映日本、台湾以及美国负面形象的新闻,而新闻
  监察员通常很乐意看到这类事情的发生。SIPRI发现在外交政策方面最具影响力的报道出现
  在《环球时报》上,而为这家报纸撰稿的都是强硬的民族主义者。
  
  The country’s excitable “netizens” tend to spread the idea that China is misunderstood and
  to see a slight round every corner. In 2008, during a Chinese row with Vietnam over the
  South China Sea, another suggested teaching the Vietnamese a lesson—and published an
  invasion plan to show how. This feeds China’s sense of victimhood. One blogger and
  journalist, called Fang Kechang, worked out that since 1948 the Chinese people had
  officially been “humiliated” at least 140 times—and that the insults were more common in
  the reform era than in Mao’s time.
  这个国家的易激动的“网民们”往往会传播一种观念:中国被误解了;他们在每个地方寻找
  被轻蔑的证据。2008年,当中国和越南在南中国海问题上发生争吵时,某人建议教训一下
  越南——还为此写出了一篇入侵计划。这助长了他们认为中国受到伤害的感觉。据一位博客
  兼记者方可苍【音译】的统计,1948年以来中国人民被正式地“羞辱”了不下140次——
  而且改革开放时期比毛泽东统治时期受到的羞辱要多。
  
  What passes for public opinion in China is not the only source of pressure on the leaders.
  The factions within China’s elite “selectorate”, no passive monolith, have also been finding
  their voice. And that, too, tends to nudge policy towards nationalism. Foreign affairs used
  to be the business of the pro-detente foreign ministry. It was mocked as the “ministry for
  selling out the country” and, supposedly, was sent calcium pills by members of the public
  who wanted to stiffen its spine.
  这些貌似公众舆论的东西,并不是领导人受到的唯一的压力。中国的精英“党员代表”中的
  一部分,并非被动的橡皮图章,也发出了自己的声音。他们也促使政策转向民族主义。外交
  事务曾经由主张缓和的外交部掌握。而它被嘲笑为“卖国部”,另外据说曾经有人给他们送
  钙片,希望他们的脊柱硬起来。
  
  Now the issues are more complex, domestic ministries and mid-level bureaucrats are also
  involved—and they tend to be more nationalistic than senior foreign-ministry officials. The
  SIPRI researchers found that the ministry of state security, in particular, has a bigger role in
  foreign policy. At the climate-change talks in Copenhagen authority lay with the National
  Development and Reform Commission, charged with economic development. China
  attracted foreign criticism for taking a hard line, against the foreign ministry’s advice.
  现在问题更为复杂了,政府其它部门和中层官员也开始介入外交事务——他们往往比高级外
  交官员有更多的民族主义倾向。SIPRI的研究发现,特别是国家安全部,在外交政策上扮演
  更重要的角色。在哥本哈根关于气候变化的讨论中,权威握在国家发展和改革委员会的手上,
  他们的职责是促进经济的发展。【在哥本哈根,】中国因为采取强硬的态度而饱受国外的批评,
  而这种态度外交部并不赞成。
  
  The PLA’s influence is harder to read. On the one hand since the 1992 party congress no
  officer has been picked for the all-important standing committee of the Politburo. At the
  end of the Cultural Revolution more than half the Politburo was from the PLA; now only two
  out of 24 are. On the other, writers from PLA research institutions are more outspoken and
  conspicuous than they used to be, using newspaper commentaries and television
  appearances to put over the PLA’s views.
  中国人民解放军的影响更是难以解读。一方面自1992年党代会以来,没有军官被选入掌握
  全权的政治局常务委员会。在文革结束时,超过一半的政治局委员来自解放军;现在的24
  名委员中只有2位是如此。另一方面,来自解放军研究机构的学者们比以前更为直率,更为
  引人注目,他们通过报纸评论和电视节目表明解放军的观点。
  
  Unlike professional Western armies, the PLA speaks out on foreign policy. In his book “The
  Party”, Richard McGregor points out that it contains roughly 90,000 party cells—one for
  every 25 soldiers. Although promotion these days depends on competence as well as
  ideology, the PLA’s political role gives it a voice in security policy. Unlike Mao and Deng,
  today’s leaders did not have a military background, so they may need to hold the PLA
  close.
  与西方的职业军队不同,中国人民解放军在外交政策方面有发言权。在其著作《党》中,理
  查德•麦格雷戈【中文名马利德】指出解放军包含大约9万个党支部——每25个士兵就有
  1个。虽然今天的晋升取决于素质,也取决于思想,但解放军的政治角色让它在安全政策上
  有权发言。不像毛和邓,今天的领导人没有军方背景,因此他们可能需要拉拢解放军。
  
  There is no reason to believe that the leaders’ authority has dimmed. If they think a policy
  is of paramount importance for the country or the party, they will get their way. The
  authorities can still put down pretty much any demonstration if they choose. But politics is
  rarely black and white, even in China. Government is usually about shades of grey. When
  the leaders hear a single message from the press, netizens and their own advisers, they
  may feel they need to listen. When public opinion is split, they can usually afford to ignore
  it. James Reilly, of the University of Sydney, who has studied China’s policy towards Japan,
  says that public pressure is most potent when the elite is divided.
  没有理由相信领导人的权威已经失色。如果他们认为一项政策对于国家或对于党是至关重要
  的,他们会推行下去。当局如果愿意的话,仍然可以扑灭几乎任何示威。但政治很少是黑白
  分明的,甚至在中国也是如此。政府通常是灰色的阴影。当领导人从媒体、从网民、从他们
  自己的顾问那里听到某条消息时,他们可能会觉得需要倾听。当公众舆论关于某件事发生分
  裂时,他们通常会无视它。主要研究中国对日政策的悉尼大学的詹姆斯•雷利说:当高层的
  意见发生分歧时,公众压力是最有效的了。
  【译者评:仔细想来,作者在这里描述的中国领导人的决策过程,用在比如奥巴马、卡梅隆
  身上,似乎也并无太多不符。】
  
  Either way, the authorities will watch public opinion, if only because protest can become a
  covert form of opposition. Anti-Japanese demonstrations in South Korea in the 1960s
  fuelled the pro-democracy movement—just as protests against African students preceded
  the Tiananmen protests in 1989. Foreign policy has a history of destabilising governments
  in China, says Rana Mitter of Oxford University, and the Chinese are quick to blame foreign
  failures on domestic weakness—“disorder at home, calamity abroad,” they like to say.
  无论如何,中国政府可能会注意公众的意见,只是因为抗议可能演变成一个隐蔽起来的反对。
  20世纪60年代的韩国反日示威活动推动了民主运动——只是为了反对非洲学生的抗议成
  为了1989年天安门前抗议的先驱。在中国,外交政策经常会破坏政府的稳定,牛津大学的
  拉纳•米特如是说,而且中国人总是把外交的失败归结为国内的问题——他们喜欢说“内不
  宁,则外有大难”。
  
  Nationalism may frame an issue before the leaders get to deal with it. By the time the row
  over, say, the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands reaches their desks, the propaganda
  department, along with commentators in the press and statements from the PLA, may
  have created a context that they cannot back away from without looking weak.
  民族主义或许在领导人准备解决某个问题之前就已经给这个问题定了性。比方说,当争吵结
  束之后,有争议的尖阁/钓鱼岛问题摆到了他们的办公桌上,宣传部、媒体的评论以及解放
  军的声明可能早就把这个问题渲染了一番,他们【指中国领导人】如果想退后,就会显得软
  弱。
  
  This dynamic is not new. It greatly complicated the mid-air collision between a Chinese
  fighter and an American spy plane in 2001, which the PLA had (wrongly) blamed on the
  Americans. But just now, in the run-up to the change of the country’s leadership in 2012,
  seeming to be a pushover could wreck careers.
  这种推动并不是什么新东西。2001年,当一架中国战斗机和一架美国侦察机相撞时,它让
  问题的处理极大地复杂化了,当时中国人民解放军(错误地)把责任归咎于美方。不过现在,
  在即将到来的2012年国家领导人换届的过程中,看起来是简单的一推,可能就会断送一份
  前程。
  
  The risk, writes Ms Shirk, is that “compromise is likely to be viewed as capitulation.” That
  creates dangers for anyone in China who favours detente. Speaking to Mr Lampton about
  Taiwan, one Chinese scholar put it this way: “If we suppose that there are two options and
  they use tough measures…and the leader fails to resolve [a problem], he is justified. But if
  [he] uses too much honey and he fails, he is regarded as guilty by all future generations.”
  谢克女士写道:风险在于“妥协可能被视为是投降”。这样就给所有倾向缓和的中国人带来
  了危险。关于台湾问题,一位中国学者是这么对兰伯顿先生说的:“假设有两个选项,他们
  选了强硬的措施……而领导人最终未能解决(问题),他会被谅解。但是如果(他)用了太
  多甜言蜜语最终还是失败了,以后的世世代代都会认为他有罪。”
  
  In the long term the leaders’ scope for action will depend on China’s economic growth. A
  booming China will indicate that the country is strong enough to press its case in the world.
  A weak China where growth has stumbled and the party feels under pressure at home
  could stir up trouble abroad. That does not leave much scope for a less assertive China.
  从长远看,领导人的行动范围将取决于中国经济的发展。一个繁荣的中国将会显示出国家的
  实力已足够强大,可以在世界上按部就班地实现自己的目的。一个经济衰落、执政党在国内
  备受压力的中国,可能在国外寻找事端。不自信的中国可以选择的范围就剩不下什么了。
  
  Supposing that the leaders want to cleave to Deng’s original injunction to “bide and hide”,
  three things are in their favour. First, popular nationalism counts for most in territorial
  disputes, such as Taiwan and the islands off China’s coast. According to Jian Yang, of
  Auckland University, New Zealand, nationalism plays less of a part in technical areas such
  as economics, which may matter as much, if not more, to China’s leaders. Second, China
  does not obviously have a grand alternative vision to the liberal order that America has
  sponsored since the second world war. It need not run into ideological battles abroad.
  假设领导人希望放弃邓小平的“等待并隐藏”的训令,有三样东西是对他们有利的。首先,
  在领土争端上大众的民族主义最为重要,比如台湾和一些海岸线外的岛屿。新西兰奥克兰大
  学的简阳【音译】认为,民族主义在比较技术化的领域,比如经济学,扮演的角色就不那么
  重要了。而这些领域对于领导人而言,重要性不亚于领土争端。第二,对于美国在二战后所
  支持的自由秩序,中国并没有提出一个宏大的替代方案。它在国外不必陷入意识形态方面的
  斗争。
  
  But third and most important, there is a lot that America and China agree on. Both want a
  healthy world economy, a stable Asia, peace in the Middle East, open sea lanes, a limit to
  proliferation, an open trading system, and so on. They have plenty of reason to want good
  enough relations to accomplish such things.
  但是第三也最重要的,美国和中国在很多方面有一致的意见。它们都需要一个健康的世界经
  济、稳定的亚洲、中东地区的和平、开放的海域、限制核扩展、开放的贸易体系,等等。它
  们有充足的理由保持足够好的关系来共同完成这些事。
楼主NileBlue 时间:2010-12-15 13:31:01
  Turn up the assertiveness
  提升自信
  
  The most likely outcome is a more assertive China that wants to get more done abroad
  without fundamentally upsetting the world order. On sensitive territorial issues where the
  party’s credentials are at stake, China may be uncompromising and increasingly
  unreasonable. Elsewhere its leaders will probably be looking for deals—though they will
  insist on better terms, as befits a global power.
  最可能的结果是一个更自信的中国更加面向海外而不必从根本上扰乱世界秩序。在敏感的领
  土问题上,由于党的声誉在此一举,中国也许变得强硬而且日益不可理喻。在其它方面,它
  的领导人可能会四处寻找生意做——不过他们将坚持更好的条件,这样才适合全球大国地
  位。
  
  How easily will the world accommodate this more assertive China? For the best part of a
  decade China has tried hard to reassure its neighbours that they have nothing to fear from
  its rise. So its new assertiveness will be doubly uncomfortable, especially if it is mixed up
  with bad-tempered territorial disputes. In other words, Asian security will be determined
  not just by how China uses its new strength but by how other countries react to it. This was
  the idea behind China’s conciliatory New Security Concept. Other countries will relax if they
  are reassured that China does not pose a threat. Unfortunately, the charm offensive has
  not altogether worked.
  世界将会怎么适应这个更为自信中国呢?过去十年的大部分时间中国一直竭尽全力安抚其
  邻国,让它们不必害怕它的崛起。所以它的新的自信将会加倍地让人不舒服,尤其如果牵涉
  到棘手的领土争端。换句话说,亚洲的安全将不仅仅取决于中国如何使用其新的力量,也取
  决于其它国家对它的反应。这是中国的安抚性的新安全观背后的实质。其它国家如果确信中
  国不造成威胁,就会放心下来。不幸的是,魅力攻势还没有完全奏效。
楼主NileBlue 时间:2010-12-15 13:32:09
  原文链接:http://www.economist.com/node/17601463
  
  A special report on China’s place in the world
  In the balance
  Their wealth depends on China, their security on America. Which way should Asian
  countries face?
  关于中国在世界上的地位的特别报告(三)
  平衡
  他们的财富取决于中国,他们的安全取决于美国。亚洲国家该面朝哪个方向?
  
  
  IN HIS book “The Rivals”, Bill Emmott, a former editor of this newspaper, quotes a senior
  Indian foreign-service official on the subject of India and China. “The thing you have to
  understand”, he says, “is that both of us think that the future belongs to us. We can’t both
  be right.”
  在他的著作《竞争对手》中,本报前任编辑比尔•埃蒙特援引了一位资深印度外交官对印度
  和中国这个问题的看法。“你要明白的是”,他说:“我们两国都认为未来属于我们。我们不
  可能都是对的。”
  
  When economists and businesspeople look at China’s rise, they see a blessing in which
  everyone stands to gain from everyone else’s prosperity. The country has become the chief
  trading partner for most parts of the region—even if the West is an important source of
  final demand. As China becomes richer, it will become a market for the rest of Asia, just as
  the region will become a bigger market for China.
  当经济学家和商人看到中国的崛起,他们看到了一个神迹,每个人都能在别人的繁荣中获益。
  这个国家已经成为该地区绝大部分国家的主要贸易伙伴——即使西方仍然是最终需求的重
  要来源。随着中国变得更富裕,它将成为其他亚洲国家的市场,正如该地区将成为中国的一
  个更大的市场一样。
  
  Alas, security does not work that way. When two countries do not really trust each other,
  greater security for one undermines the security of the other, as that Indian official
  revealed. In a troubled continent like Asia, countries therefore look to America to save
  them from an increasingly powerful China—to “the water far away” for protection from
  “the fire nearby”.
  唉,安全问题不能像这样解决。当两个国家不能真地互相信任时,一方加强军备就是对另一
  方的安全的削弱,一位印度安全官员如是说。在一个像亚洲这样充满麻烦的大陆,亚洲国家
  因此希望美国来保护它们免遭一个日益强大的中国【的压迫】——用“远水”来救“近火”。
  
  Naturally, Asian countries want to have it both ways: to resist China’s power but to
  continue trading with it; to benefit from American security but without sacrificing Chinese
  commerce. This is a difficult trick to pull off, and if relations between America and China
  become harder to manage over the next decade or so, as looks likely, the region will sit
  uncomfortably between two poles. The lesser powers could even add to the tension
  between the two giants.
  当然,亚洲国家希望鱼与熊掌兼得:对抗中国的实力,而又继续和它做生意;得益于美国的
  安全保护但又不至于牺牲和中国的贸易。这是一个很难玩好的把戏,如果在未来的十年里美
  国和中国的关系变得越来越难处理,看起来很可以会如此,该地区将很不舒服地坐在两极之
  间。小的强国甚至可能增加两大巨头之间的紧张气氛。
  【译者评:作者在全文中似乎在渲染一种印象:即除中国自己外,所有亚洲国家都害怕中国
  的崛起。而这些害怕中国的亚洲国家,又全部倒向美国。】
  
  That would frustrate China, which has been at pains in recent years to reassure its
  neighbours by doing the right thing, as well as by soft-soaping them with all the talk about
  a “peaceful rise”. It has, for instance, gone out of its way to settle its border disputes—and
  on notably generous terms. Taylor Fravel, of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
  concluded that in settling 17 of its 23 territorial disputes China usually agreed to take less
  than half of the contested land. It has also usually been generous in economic diplomacy,
  signing a series of free-trade agreements across Asia. “In the space of a decade”,
  according to Marc Lanteigne, of Victoria University in Wellington, New Zealand, “China has
  transformed itself from a sceptic of liberalised and preferential trade into one of their
  strongest proponents.”
  那样将让中国非常失望,近年来它努力地安抚其邻国,做正确的事,它还用“和平崛起”之
  类的话奉承它们。比如,它竭尽全力去解决边界争端——而且条件非常优惠。麻省理工学院
  的泰勒•弗拉维尔的研究结论是:23项领土争端中的17项得到了解决,中国一般同意接受
  不到一半的有争议的土地。在经济外交上它也通常也很慷慨,签订了一系列遍布亚洲的自由
  贸易协定。“在一个十年的跨度里”,新西兰惠灵顿的维多利亚大学的马克•郎铁格说:“中
  国从一个对自由贸易和特惠贸易的怀疑者,变成了最坚定的支持者之一。”
  
  China has joined multinational groupings (even, in the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation,
  helping to found one). It is now a member of more than 50 intergovernmental and over
  1,000 international non-governmental outfits. You can find Chinese delegates at the
  ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN Plus Three, the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting and
  APEC—and that is only the meetings starting with A. Asian states hope that, like Gulliver,
  China can be bound by these regional threads.
  中国已经加入许多跨国集团(甚至还参与建立了一个:上海合作组织)。现在它是超过50
  个政府间机构、超过1000个国际非政府机构的成员。你可以发现中国代表们出现在东盟地
  区论坛、东盟10+3、东盟防长会议以及APEC——-这还仅仅是字母A打头的机构。亚洲国
  家希望,像格利佛一样,中国能够被这些区域的绳索限制住。
  
  That is to put a lot of faith in multinational forums, however. Criticising diplomats for trying
  to talk peace might seem harsh, but Asia has too many regional assemblies. The Japan
  Centre for International Exchange counted 277 multilateral intergovernmental meetings
  about security in 2007 alone.
  不过,这是对跨国论坛抱有很高信心的举措。批评外交官们谋求和平似乎是苛刻的,但亚洲
  有太多的区域团体了。据日本国际交流中心统计,在2007年一年里,有关安全的多边政府
  间会议就有277场之多。
  
  Nick Bisley, of La Trobe University in Australia, who has studied Asia’s regional-security
  groups, concludes that this seeming abundance is really a mask for mistrust, as each Asian
  country tries to shop in its own favoured forum. Meetings can be superficial and leaders
  tend to shy away from taking real, binding decisions. Being in the media spotlight does not
  help. Asia’s various forums and treaties “looks more like a list of cats and dogs than a
  coherent and predictable framework for the future”, writes Gary Schmitt of the American
  Enterprise Institute in Washington.
  澳大利亚的拉筹伯大学的尼克•比斯利,主要研究亚洲区域安全团体,他认为这表面上的热
  闹只是掩盖互不信任的面具,因为每个亚洲国家都试图在自己钟爱的论坛里混。会议可能流
  于表面,领袖人也倾向于不愿做真正的、有约束力的决定。聚焦在媒体的聚光灯下并没有什
  么作用。亚洲的各种论坛和条约“看起来更像一系列的争吵,而不像一个连贯的、可预测的、
  面向未来的框架”,在华盛顿的美国企业研究所的加里•施密特这样写道。
  
  Part of the trouble is that these forums have to purge a lot of bad blood. Although China
  gets on better with its 14 neighbours now than it has done for centuries, it still fully trusts
  none of them—and vice versa. Relations with Japan have never got over the imperial
  occupation. Since 1949 China has skirmished with Russia and fought the UN in Korea and
  India and Vietnam.
  一部分问题是这些论坛应该清洗掉一些旧恶。尽管中国现在比以前几个世纪都更好地与其
  14个邻国相处,它仍然没有完全信赖它们——反之亦然。与日本的关系从来没有跨过“帝
  国占领”这道坎。自1949年以来,中国与俄国有过冲突,和联合国在朝鲜打过一仗,交过
  手的还有印度和越南。
楼主NileBlue 时间:2010-12-15 13:34:46
  Naval battles
  海战
  
  In addition China has pressed its sea claims with a vehemence that it has mostly avoided in
  land-border disputes, perhaps because fish and mineral riches are at stake. In the past 36
  years China has skirmished over the Paracel Islands with Vietnam (1974); over the Spratly
  Islands with Vietnam (1988) and the Philippines (1994); with South Korea over Socotra
  Rock (2006); and with Japan over the Okinotori Islands (2004) and the Senkaku/Diaoyu
  Islands (most recently, 2010).
  此外,中国正以一种处理陆地边界时少见的激烈态度来主张其海洋主权,也许是因为有丧失
  渔业和矿产权益的危险。在过去36年中,中国在西沙群岛与越南(1974年);在南沙群岛
  与越南(1988年)、与菲律宾(1994年);在苏岩礁与韩国(2006年);在冲之鸟岛(2004
  年)、在尖阁/钓鱼岛(最近,2010年)与日本,都发生过冲突。
  
  With so many neighbours pulling in so many different directions, Beijing’s foreign policy
  faces inevitable contradictions. When North Korea sank the Cheonan, China had to choose
  between security and its increasingly close ties to South Korea. In siding with the North, it
  sent a damaging signal to the South that it was unwilling or unable to control its ally.
  Likewise, Chinese relations with India are complicated by what happens in neighbouring
  countries. Not only does India mistrust China in Pakistan, but it vies with it in places such
  as Nepal and Sri Lanka that it sees as within its own sphere of influence.
  这么多的邻国都各有其打算,北京的外交政策面临着不可避免的矛盾。在朝鲜击沉了“天安
  号”之后,中国不得不在安全和与韩国日益密切的关系之间作出选择。选择和北方站到一起,
  就是向南方送出了一个破坏性的信号:它不愿或无力控制其盟友。与之相似,中国与印度的
  关系也因其邻国发生的事情变得复杂。印度不仅在巴基斯坦问题上不信任中国,在比如尼泊
  尔和斯里兰卡这些印度认为是自己的势力范围内的问题上,印度对中国也感到厌恶。
  
  How, then, do Asian countries cope with China’s strength and the shortcomings of
  multinational organisations? They are slowly but steadily buying weapons as they get
  richer. In its defence white paper last year Australia worried aloud about a powerful China
  and suggested renewing and doubling its submarine fleet as well as designing a more
  capable “future frigate”. Vietnam has ordered six Kilo-class submarines from Russia. Earlier,
  Singapore bought two Swedish Archer-class submarines and Malaysia and India between
  them bought eight French Scorpène-class submarines.
  那么,亚洲国家在面对中国的力量和跨国机构的缺点时该怎么办呢?随着逐渐富裕,它们正
  在缓慢但不间断地购买武器。在去年的国防白皮书中,澳大利亚明确对中国的强大表示忧虑,
  提出更新其潜艇舰队并翻番潜艇的数量,以及设计更强大的“未来护卫舰”。越南已经从俄
  罗斯订购了六艘“基洛”级潜艇。早些时候,新加坡购买了两艘瑞典的“Archer”级潜艇,
  马来西亚和印度一共购买了8艘法国的“Scorpène”级潜艇。
  
  Japan, too, has been arming itself in a roundabout way. Although its official defence
  budget is only 1% of its GDP and over the past decade has shrunk by over 3% in nominal
  terms, in real terms it has fallen by more like 1%. Japan has also been shifting resources
  towards its navy, which is still more than a match for China’s. And Richard Samuels, of the
  Massachusetts Institute of Technology, has shown that the Japanese coastguard, financed
  outside the defence budget, now has a fleet of ships and rules of engagement that are
  laxer than those of the self-defence forces.
  日本也在迂回武装自己。虽然官方的国防预算仅为GDP的1%,且过去十年中在名义上已
  降低了3%,实际上降幅似乎仅1%。日本也将资源向海军倾斜,它的海军仍然胜中国海军
  一筹。麻省理工学院的理查德•塞缪尔斯的研究表明:日本海岸警卫队的资金是独立于国防
  预算的,现在已有成批的船只,而且其交战规则要比自卫队更宽松。
  
  As well as arming themselves, Asian countries have drawn closer to the United States. This
  was on dramatic display at the ASEAN regional forum in Hanoi in July. In a piece of
  choreography that infuriated China, ASEAN members complained one after the other about
  the heavy-handed way their neighbour was asserting a claim over the South China Sea.
  The statements culminated with Hillary Clinton, America’s secretary of state, underlining
  how her country would intercede to ensure safe passage through international waters.
  一边武装自己,亚洲国家一边向美国靠拢。7月,在河内举行的东盟地区论坛上,这种情况
  有了一个戏剧化的表现。东盟成员国一个接一个地抱怨中国粗暴地对其邻国宣称在南中国海
  的主权,这一幕激怒了中国。这出戏的高潮一幕是美国国务卿希拉里•克林顿强调:她的国
  家会来调解纠纷,以保证国际水域的航线的安全。
  【译者评:奇怪了,和中国有海洋主权纠纷的国家一共才几个?不谈日本(因为不属东盟),
  应该就越南和菲律宾两个。作者居然还“一个接一个”,危言耸听乎?
  在整篇文章里,作者似乎在渲染一种“中国被亚洲各国围攻”的印象(前文、后文都有表现)。
  而其依据仅仅是和中国有领土/领海纠纷的几个国家,比如日本、印度、越南等。难道这些
  国家就足以代表亚洲吗?巴基斯坦、斯里兰卡、柬埔寨、泰国、缅甸、伊朗、沙特等等,难
  道就不算亚洲国家?】
  
  Progress has been made bilaterally, too. In August Vietnam and America began high-level
  military co-operation, with a meeting in Hanoi. Vietnamese officials have been aboard the
  aircraft-carrier USS George Washington off the Vietnamese coast. American naval ships
  have docked in Vietnam, which has agreed to repair American Sealift Command vessels. It
  seems longer than 35 years ago that the two countries were at war.
  双边关系也取得了长足的进展。8月,在河内的一次会议上,越南和美国开始了高级别军事
  合作。越南的官员登上了停靠在越南海岸的“乔治•华盛顿号”航母。越南同意对停靠在越
  南的美国海上补给船进行修补。一点也看不出35年前两国曾处于交战状态。
楼主NileBlue 时间:2010-12-15 13:36:41
  So-so about Uncle Sam
  对于山姆大叔来说,一般般
  
  Yet there is nothing straightforward about looking for security to America—Asia’s least
  distrusted power, as Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore’s “Minister Mentor”, has described it.
  Sometimes countries have to overcome obstacles at home. During George Bush’s
  presidency, India and America cemented their new entente with a deal to work together in
  nuclear power. Yet even that degree of intimacy stirred up domestic opposition from
  left-wing Indians. A fully fledged defence agreement with America to contain China does
  not seem on the cards for now. India would not relish a junior role and it prides itself on its
  non-alignment.
  然而正如李光耀,新加坡的“导师”所描述的,向美国——这个亚洲国家最信赖的大国——
  寻求安全保护,仍然充满了波折。有时候一些国家得克服来自国内的阻力。在乔治•布什担
  任总统期间,印度和美国达成了一项新的共同开发核电的协议。然而,即使这种程度的亲密
  也激怒了印度国内的左翼反对派。与美国达成一项全方面的国防协议来围堵中国,似乎是不
  可能的。印度对扮演小角色不感兴趣,而且它自豪于其不结盟政策。
  
  Nor would it wish completely to cast out China—a rival, yes, but also an ally on such things
  as climate change and global economic issues. Besides, as Rahul Roy-Chaudhury of the
  IISS points out, Indian politicians are disconnected from the armed forces. Without an
  effective national security council in which to make its case, the navy has only slowly been
  able to convince the government that China may become a threat.
  印度也不希望完全抛弃中国——竞争对手,是的,但是在诸如有关气候变化和全球经济问题
  上中国也是一个盟友。此外,正如IISS【International Institute for Strategic Studies,国际
  战略研究所,总部在伦敦】的拉胡尔•罗伊所指出的:印度的政客与武装力量是脱节的。在
  国家安全委员会无法有效运作的情况下,海军只能缓慢地说服政府中国可能是一个威胁。
  
  The Indian services can mount impressive operations, but in a new book on the country’s
  military modernisation Stephen Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta argue that they also suffer from
  inter-service rivalry, poor procurement and a lingering suspicion of the use of armed force
  (which from independence was associated with British colonial rule).
  印度军人能够完成令人印象深刻的行动,但是在关于印度的军事现代化的一本新书中,斯蒂
  芬•科恩和桑尼尔•达斯哥普达认为:印军的实力受制于兵种之间的对抗、拙劣的采购等因
  素,而且印度一直有一种对使用武力的怀疑(因为自从印度独立,人们一想起军队就免不了
  想起英国殖民统治)。
  
  Or take South Korea, a long-term American ally, which has veered from security to
  economics and back again. Under President Roh Moo-hyun the country peeled off from
  America in an attempt to demonstrate its independence as an Asian power with
  increasingly close economic links to China. In 2007 Roh won America’s agreement that
  from 2012 South Korea would once again have command of its own forces in the event of
  a war. He also supplied the North when America cut off energy aid. However, his successor,
  Lee Myung-bak, has wrenched policy towards American security once more. He has
  delayed the transfer of wartime command to 2015 and taken a hard line on North Korea.
  再来看看韩国,美国的长期盟友,曾经从重视安全转向重视经济,现在又转回来了。卢武铉
  总统时期,韩国远离美国,加强与中国的经济联系,以此来证明自己是一个独立的亚洲强国。
  2007年,卢武铉成功地与美国签署协议:自2012年起,如果爆发战争韩国将会再次指挥
  自己的军队。他还在美国切断能源援助时向北方提供了供应。然而,他的继任者李明博把政
  策再次转向寻求美国的保护。他把战争期间指挥权的转交时间推迟到2015年,对朝鲜也采
  取强硬路线。
  
  In Japan different factions exhibit all these tendencies and more. Parts of the governing
  Democratic Party of Japan have sought to move Japan closer to China. Parts of the Liberal
  Democratic Party, now in opposition after decades in government, resent the presence of
  36,000 American military personnel in bases dotted across the country. Others are so
  wedded to pacifism that the Americans wonder if the Japanese would actually turn up if
  they were needed. And yet others harbour doubts whether Japan can always count on
  America. To many Japanese, the row over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands has shown how
  prickly China can be. After the coastguard arrested the fishermen, China cancelled
  meetings, gummed up Japanese trade and stopped exports of rare earths. Japanese
  diplomats were pleased that Mrs Clinton spoke out in their support. Yet MIT’s Mr Samuels
  thinks America needs to reassure Japan, its most vital ally in Asia. If Japan appeared to
  doubt it, America would see all of its Asian alliances suffer.
  在日本,不同阵营的倾向比上面的更明显、更多。部分执政的日本民主党人士主张日本应该
  靠拢中国。执政几十年后成为反对党的自由民主党内,部分人士对散布在日本全境的36000
  处美军基地感到愤慨。另一些人则深陷和平主义,美国人都不清楚如果需要他们的话,日本
  人是否会出现。还有一些人则怀疑日本是否总能指望美国。对于许多日本人来说,关于尖阁
  /钓鱼岛的摩擦表现出中国有多么蛮横。海岸警卫队逮捕了渔民之后,中国取消了会谈、压
  缩了与日本的贸易、停止了对日本的稀土出口。日本外交官对克林顿夫人表达的支持都很高
  兴。然而麻省理工学院的塞缪尔先生认为美国需要安抚日本,这个美国在亚洲的最重要的盟
  友。如果日本开始怀疑,美国的所有亚洲盟友都将受到影响。
  
  The calculation for China is different. Its efforts to cultivate its neighbours have produced
  only mixed results. Economic ties buy a certain amount of goodwill, but much of the region
  rushes off to America at the first sign of trouble. As China’s appetite to assert itself grows,
  that could easily become a source of dissatisfaction, which would feed the superpowers’
  mutual mistrust. Either way, America and China are likely to compete to win the loyalty of
  the region. That, too, could poison the most important relationship of all—the one between
  China and America.
  中国考虑的是不同的问题。它努力培养与其邻国的关系产生的是混杂的结果。经济关系带来
  了一定的善意,但大部分地区只要一看到苗头不对就会转投美国。随着中国越来越想维护自
  己的利益,这将很容易成为不满的源头,从而加深超级大国的相互猜疑。不管怎么说,美国
  和中国可能会比赛来赢得本地区各国的忠诚。这种情况,则会让最重要的双边关系——中、
  美之间的关系变得险恶。
楼主NileBlue 时间:2010-12-15 13:38:51
  原文链接:http://www.economist.com/node/17601453
  
  A special report on China’s place in the world
  Friends, or else
  Living with China’s rise will test America’s diplomacy as never before
  关于中国在世界上的地位的特别报告(四)
  做朋友,不然的话……
  和崛起的中国共存将空前绝后地考验美国的外交
  
  
  IN A recent essay Hugh White, a former Australian security and defence official, describes
  the following exchange with his American counterparts: “I put this catechism to them: ‘Do
  you think America should treat China as an equal if its power grows equal to America’s?’
  The answer is always no. Then I ask, ‘Do you think China will settle for anything less than
  being treated as equal?’ The answer to that is always no, too. Then I ask, ‘So how do you
  expect the US and China to get along?’ I usually get a shrug by way of reply.”
  一位前澳大利亚安全和国防官员休•怀特在最近的一篇文章中,描述了和他的美国同行之间
  的这样一段对话:“我对他提出一系列提问:‘如果中国的实力强大到和美国一样,你觉得美
  国会接受和中国平起平坐吗?’回答是不。我又问:‘你认为那时的中国会接受低于平起平
  坐的地位吗?’对这个问题的回答也是不。然后我问:‘那么你指望美国和中国该怎么相处
  呢?’我得到的回答通常是耸耸肩。”
  
  That shrug is a measure of America’s difficulty in designing a China policy. America wants
  China to be a thriving market for its goods. It also wants China to become an active,
  responsible power in world affairs. Yet at the same time it feels threatened by China’s
  growing economic, industrial, diplomatic and military might. When America dislikes a
  position China has taken, it cries foul. This mix of partnership and rivalry is a recipe for
  confusion.
  耸耸肩其实表现出的是美国在制定对华政策上的困难。美国希望中国成为一个有利于其产品
  出口的、繁荣的市场。同时也希望中国在国际事务中成为一个积极的、负责任的大国。但与
  此同时,面对中国日益增长的经济、产业、外交和军事力量,美国又感觉到中国的威胁。当
  美国不喜欢中国采取某个立场的时候,它就喊中国犯规了。这种既是伙伴又是对手的关系肯
  定会导致混乱。
  
  One way to resolve these tensions would be to put security first. America could aim to
  block China now before it gets any stronger. America won the cold war by isolating the
  Soviet economy and stalemating its armed forces. But trying that again would be a bad
  idea, as Robert Art explains in a recent issue of Political Science Quarterly. For one thing,
  the cost would be astronomical; for another, America might suffer as much as China. The
  two countries’ economies are intertwined and China owns more American government
  debt than anyone else. In war, nations override such factors out of necessity. If an
  American president tried to override them in peace out of choice, he would face dissent at
  home and opprobrium abroad.
  解决这些冲突的一种方法是把安全放到第一位。美国可以在中国变得更强大之前现在就阻止
  中国【的成长】。美国在冷战中获胜的办法是孤立苏联的经济、把它的武力胶着【于阿富汗】。
  然而再用这一招则是一个馊主意,正如罗伯特•阿特在最近一期的《政治科学季刊》中说明
  的那样。其一,成本会是天文数字;其二,这么做对美国的伤害也许会和对中国的伤害一样
  多。这两个国家的经济有着千丝万缕的联系,而且中国比其它任何国家都拥有更多的美国政
  府债券。在战争时期,国家出于需要可以把这些因素忽略不计。假如一位美国总统由于别无
  选择,在和平时期就试图忽略这些因素,他将面对国内的反对和国外的羞辱。
楼主NileBlue 时间:2010-12-15 13:41:01
  The risks of containment
  遏制的风险
  
  In any case, a policy of containment risks backfiring, except against an unambiguously
  hostile China. Unless America could persuade large parts of the world to join in, China
  would still have access to most markets. A belligerent United States would risk losing the
  very alliances in Asia that it was seeking to protect. And Joseph Nye, of the Kennedy School
  at Harvard, has argued that the best way to make an enemy of China is to treat it like one.
  在任何情况下,采取遏制政策都有适得其反的危险,除非面对的是一个明确敌视美国的中国。
  如果美国不能说服世界上的大部分地区加入对中国的遏制,中国将仍能进入大多数市场。一
  个好战的美国可能有失去在亚洲的同盟的危险,而这些同盟正是它想去保护的。哈佛大学肯
  尼迪学院约瑟夫•奈认为,把中国当成敌人,最可能的结果是中国真就成了敌人。
  
  America may one day feel it has no choice but to focus on security alone, which is what
  China fears. By contrast, to focus on economics and forget security makes no sense at all.
  America has vital interests in Asia. It wants to prevent nuclear proliferation in the Korean
  peninsula and Japan. It has allies to protect and threats to police. It needs accessible sea
  lanes and open markets. America is the world’s pre-eminent power. It cannot surrender
  Asia without losing influence everywhere else.
  美国也许有一天会觉得别无选择,只能关注安全问题,这是中国不愿看到的。相比之下,把
  注意力集中在经济上,忘记安全,这样做也是毫无道理的。美国在亚洲有至关重要的利益。
  它想防止朝鲜半岛和日本的核扩散。它要保护盟友、消灭威胁。它需要畅通的海上航线和开
  放的市场。美国是世界上占主导的力量。它如果放弃亚洲就将在世界其它地方失去其影响力。
  【译者评:最后几句话有点自己给自己打气的感觉。】
  
  Hence for the past 15 years America has fallen back on a two-track China policy. Barack
  Obama articulated the first track on his visit to China in November last year. He told the
  students at Fudan University, in Shanghai: “The United States insists we do not seek to
  contain China’s rise. On the contrary, we welcome China as a strong and prosperous and
  successful member of the community of nations.” This means, as the president later
  explained in front of Hu Jintao, his Chinese opposite number, that China’s “growing
  economy is joined by growing responsibilities”.
  于是过去15年来,美国对中国实行的是双轨制的政策。巴拉克•奥巴马在去年11月第一
  次访华时阐明了其中的第一条。他对上海的复旦大学的学生们说:“美国坚持认为我们不会
  去抑制中国的崛起。相反,我们欢迎中国成为国际大家庭中一个强大、繁荣、成功的成员。”
  这句话的意思是,如总统后来对中国国家主席胡锦涛所说,中国的“经济的发展意味着责任
  的增加”。
  
  “Engagement” is backed by a second policy, best described as hedging. America must be
  able to deploy enough force to deter China. Presidents do not articulate this track quite so
  eagerly, but Admiral Robert Willard, head of Pacific Command, was clear enough in his
  remarks to Congress earlier this year: “Until…it is determined that China’s intent is indeed
  benign, it is critical that we maintain the readiness of our postured forces; continually
  reinforce our commitment to our allies and partners in the region; and meet each
  challenge by the PRC in a professional manner that is consistent with international law.”
  支持着“接触”(engagement)的是第二条政策,可以被恰如其分地称为“对冲”(hedging)。
  美国必须保有足够的力量来威慑中国。总统并没有清晰表述这一条政策,但太平洋司令部的
  负责人罗伯特•威拉德海军上将今年早些时候在国会作证时明确指出:“直到……我们能确
  信中国的意图确实是善意的,保持我们现有的态势是十分关键的;不断地加强和本区域的盟
  国和伙伴的联系;以专业的、符合国际法的态度面对来自中华人民共和国的挑战。”
  
  America faced some straightforward, if terrifying, calculations in its monochromatic
  relationship with the Soviet Union. By contrast, its technicolour dealings with China are less
  apocalyptic, but many times more complex—almost unmanageably so.
  在如黑白影片般的与苏联的关系中,美国曾经面对着一些明白的、可怕的计谋。与之形成鲜
  明对比,如彩色影片般的与中国的关系并不让人感到大难临头,但要复杂很多倍——复杂得
  几乎无解。
  
  In principle, the policy’s two tracks fit together well. Engagement is designed to reward
  good behaviour and hedging to deter bad. In practice, however, the hedge risks
  undermining the engagement. To see why, consider that the existence of two tracks acts as
  an excuse to leave important issues unresolved in America. China hawks and China doves
  can all support the policy, because both can continue to think that they will ultimately be
  proved right.
  原则上,双轨政策的两条可以很好的结合在一起。做了好事就用“接触”来奖励,做了坏事
  就用“对冲”来威慑。然而,实际上“对冲”有可能破坏“接触”。为了说明原因,我们可
  以把双轨政策的存在理解为:美国对于这个重要的问题其实并没有解决。中国的鹰派和鸽派
  都支持该政策,因为双方都认为自己最终会被证明是正确的。
  【译者评:做了好事就……,做了坏事就……。即使在最理想的情况下,这个所谓的“双轨”
  政策还是让人联想起奴隶主和奴隶的关系。】
  
  That is politically handy in Washington, but hardly ideal as a policy. The engagement tends
  to be run by China specialists in the state department and the hedge tends to be run out of
  the Pentagon. In theory the policy’s two dimensions should be weighted according to
  whether or not China’s behaviour is threatening. With the best will in the world, the
  departments of state and defence do not always work well together. All too often, a
  twin-track policy can function as two separate policies.
  在华盛顿,双轨政策在政治上是很方便的,作为政策则很不理想。主张“接触”的往往是国
  务院的中国问题专家们,而“对冲”往往出自五角大楼。从理论上说,平衡这种政策的两个
  方面应该视中国的行为是否具有危险而定。然而不管人们的愿望如何善良,国务院和国防部
  的合作不总是很好。通常情况下,双轨政策执行起来就成了背道而驰。
楼主NileBlue 时间:2010-12-15 13:42:02
  Read my lips
  你给我仔细听好了
  
  That matters because Mr Obama’s generous words towards China are not taken at face
  value there. However sincere, no president’s words could be: pledges are broken and
  presidents come and go. America sends a signal when it redeploys naval forces to the
  Pacific and its admirals tell Congress that “China’s interest in a peaceful and stable
  environmentis difficult to reconcile with [its] evolving military capabilities.” Those
  judgments make good sense for America’s security, but they get in the way of the message
  that the United States welcomes China’s rise and has no intention of blocking it.
  这一点很重要,因为奥巴马先生对中国的慷慨之辞中国人并不认为只是几句话而已。然而不
  管总统的话有多么真诚,承诺还是会打破,总统来了又去。当美国在太平洋重新部署海军军
  力的时候,当海军上将告诉国会:“中国对和平与稳定的发展环境的兴趣,很难与(其)不
  断成长的军事能力相调和”的时候,这些都是在向中国发出信号。这些判断对于美国的国家
  安全来说很有道理,但是和另一种说法——美国欢迎中国的崛起,而且并不打算阻止它——
  相冲突。
  
  Hedging is not engagement’s only complication. For much of the past 15 years, commerce
  drew America towards China. Indeed, globalisation became a large part of the
  engagement story. But now that one in ten Americans is without work, economic policy has
  taken on a protectionist tinge. If China loses the political backing of America’s big-business
  lobby, which has lately been growing restive at its treatment in China, then the tone in
  Washington will shift further. Thus commerce could also start to add to Chinese fears that
  America will ultimately choose to block it.
  “对冲”并不是“接触”的唯一麻烦。在过去15年的大部分时间里,商业把美国推向中国。
  事实上,“接触”的内容里有很大部分就是全球化。但现在十分之一的美国人没有工作,经
  济政策有了一种贸易保护主义的迹象。美国大企业由于最近在中国受到的待遇而变得谨慎,
  而如果中国失去了大企业游说团体的政治支持,那么华盛顿的调子就会走得更远。因此中国
  担心商界也开始推动美国最终选择阻止中国。
  
  The second doubt about America’s China policy is whether America has fully accepted what
  engagement asks of it. The policy rests on two notions. First, that China can develop as a
  “satisfied power”—one that feels no need to overturn the post-war order created and
  maintained by America. And second, that if China more or less abides by global norms,
  America will be able to accommodate its interests. So engagement supposes that China
  and America can find a stable mix of Chinese adherence and American accommodation.
  针对美国对华政策的第二个怀疑是美国是否会完全接受“接触”的后果。这一政策依赖于两
  个判断。其一,中国会成为一个“要求得到满足的强国”——中国觉得没有必要去推翻由美
  国创建并维持的战后秩序。其二,如果中国大体上遵守全球准则,美国就可以满足中国的利
  益。所以“接触”认为:在中国的坚持和美国的容许之间,中、美是可以找一个稳定的中间
  态的。
  
  Does China abide by “global norms”? At one time the common belief was that, as Bill
  Clinton said, “when it comes to human rights and religious freedom, China remains on the
  wrong side of history.” Some Western analysts like to issue caveats about devious,
  far-sighted Chinese strategy. Against this racial stereotype, however, it was America, not
  China, that founded its policy on the maxim of Sun Tzu that it is best to win without
  fighting.
  中国是否遵守“全球准则”?曾有一段时间大家的共同信念是这样的,如比尔•克林顿所说,
  “就人权及宗教自由来说,中国仍停留在历史的错误一面。”一些西方分析家喜欢发出警告,
  说中国的战略是狡滑而有远见的。然而,和这个种族印象相反,是美国而不是中国,把其政
  策建立在孙子的格言“不战而屈人之兵”的基础上。
  【译者评:这么喜欢孙子的话,怎么伊拉克和阿富汗就没有享受到“不战而屈人之兵”的待
  遇呢?明明是吃不掉对方只能退而求其次,这里倒写成计高一筹的模样了。再说,作者怎么
  知道中国就没有遵从“不战而屈人之兵”呢?】
  
  Chinese values have changed beyond recognition since Mao’s day, when terror was
  dismally routine. As Richard McGregor writes in his book, “The Party”, terror is now used
  sparingly. Hu Jintao’s China works on seduction and bribery rather than suppression. And
  yet China is still a one-party state and terror remains essential to its survival. When the
  party needs protecting, it is applied without scruple.
  和恐怖是家常便饭的毛时代相比,中国的价值观已经变得认不出来了。正如理查德•麦格雷
  戈的著作《党》中所写,恐怖现在很少使用。胡锦涛的工作重心是腐败、贿赂,而不是压迫。
  但是中国仍然是一个一党专制的国家,恐怖仍是其生存的要素。当党需要保护自己的时候,
  它是肆无忌惮的。
  
  Likewise, in international affairs China no longer backs insurgencies against its neighbours
  or routinely adopts intransigent positions, seemingly for the sake of it. Yet the West still
  finds it a difficult partner. American critics such as Gary Schmitt of the American Enterprise
  Institute in Washington accuse China of a “supermarket approach”: it buys what it must,
  picks up what it wants and ignores what it does not.
  同样地,在国际事务中,中国不再支持邻国的叛乱份子,也不再经常为了强硬而强硬。然而
  西方仍觉得和中国很难合作。如在华盛顿的美国企业研究所的批评家加里•施密特,指责中
  国有一种“超市态度”:它买自己必需的,拿起自己想要的,其它就什么都不管了。
楼主NileBlue 时间:2010-12-15 13:44:11
  Hope is not a policy
  希望,并不是一种政策
  
  The hope is that in years to come China will indeed grow to be more democratic and that it
  will play its part in world affairs. But, says Richard Armitage, deputy secretary of state
  under George Bush, “hope is not a policy.” Given the problems of Western democracies and
  China’s economic success and relative stability, says Richard Woolcott, a special envoy for
  the Australian prime minister, China’s conversion to a multiparty democracy no longer
  seems quite so inevitable. Just now, the Communist Party looks firmly in control.
  所谓希望,就是指在未来的岁月里,中国将真地变得更加民主,而且它担负起在国际事务中
  的责任。但是,曾在乔治•布什政府中担任副国务卿的理查德•阿米蒂奇说:“希望,并不
  是一种政策。”曾任澳大利亚总理特使的理查德•伍尔科特说:考虑到西方民主国家的问题、
  中国的经济的成功和相对的稳定性,中国转化成一个多党制民主国家不再是那么不可避免的
  了。时下,共产党看起来牢牢控制着政权。
  
  Suppose, therefore, that China remains a communist, authoritarian, one-party state with a
  growing appetite to get its way. Can America accommodate it?
  那么假设中国仍然是一个共产党掌权的、集权的、一党制的国家,而且其需求在不断地上升。
  美国能容许它吗?
  
  Some American thinkers, like John Ikenberry, of Princeton University, make the argument
  that America has created a rules-based system that is uniquely able to absorb new
  members. Institutions like the United Nations, the G20, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
  Treaty (NPT) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) could, in theory at least, operate
  even without American leadership. According to this picture, America can accept China so
  long as it fits in with this order.
  一些美国的思想家,比如普林斯顿大学的约翰•埃肯伯里认为美国曾创造出一个由规则主导
  的系统,其特点就是能吸纳新成员。诸如联合国、二十国集团、《核不扩散条约》(NPT)和
  世界贸易组织(WTO)这样的组织,至少在理论上,即使没有美国的领导也能运作下去。
  按照这种构想,只要中国符合这一秩序,美国就可以接受它。
  
  But the picture is flawed. America has indeed been willing to be bound by rules in ways
  that 19th-century European powers never were. That is one reason why so many countries
  have been prepared to live under its sway. However, when America thinks important
  interests are at stake, it still ignores the rules, just like the next hegemon. In 2005 the bid
  of the China National Offshore Oil Company to buy America’s Unocal was, in effect, blocked
  after a public outcry. When America wanted a nuclear deal with India, it rode a coach and
  horses through the NPT. It fought in the Balkans in the 1990s and again in Iraq in 2003
  without the endorsement of the United Nations. It may yet go to war with Iran on the same
  basis.
  但是这种构想是有缺陷的。美国确实愿意以19世纪的欧洲列强从未有过的方式来遵守规则。
  正因为如此,许多国家已经准备好在它的支配下生活。然而,当美国认为重要的利益受威胁
  时,它依然不理那些规则,正如别的霸权一样。2005年,中国海洋石油公司准备购买美国
  优尼科公司(Unocal)的投标,确切地说,就是因为公众的责难而被中止。当美国想要和印
  度签订一个核能协定时,它完全置《不扩散核武器条约》于不顾。美国在上世纪90年代在
  巴尔干、2003年在伊拉克动用武力,都未经联合国的批准。它还可能以同样依据去进攻伊
  朗。
  【译者评:作者说了半天,结果只是说明了“超级大国(即美国)是有缺陷的”,并没有说
  明“构想是有缺陷的”。一个超级大国必然在利益的驱使下去破坏自己定下的规则?】
  
  This is not to dispute the merits of each case, though some of those decisions looked
  foolish even at the time. Rather the point is that superpowers break the rules when they
  must—and nobody can stop them. Over time that logic will increasingly apply to China too.
  America must decide whether “accommodating China” means living with this or denying it.
  这里并不想争论上面每个个案的得失,尽管有些决定在当时就看上去很蠢。现在的问题是:
  当超级大国觉得必要时,它们就会打破规则——而且没人可以阻止它们。随着时间的推移,
  这种逻辑越来越适用于中国了。美国必须决定是否“容忍中国”就意味着放任这种情况,还
  是反对它。
  
  In fact, there are difficulties with judging whether China is a responsible stakeholder. From
  the Chinese point of view, America always seems to define acceptable international
  conduct as falling in with its own policy. In the words of Yuan Peng, of the China Institutes
  of Contemporary International Relations in Beijing, America’s complaint is “not that China
  says no to global responsibility or denies its role in world affairs, but rather that it declines
  to say yes to every US request”.
  事实上,在判断中国是否是一个“负责任的利益相关方”上,确实有困难。从中国的观点看,
  美国似乎总是把“可接受的国际行为”定义为“符合美国政策的行为”。用在北京的当代国
  际关系学院的袁鹏的话来说:美国抱怨的“不是中国推卸全球责任或拒绝在世界事务中发挥
  作用,而是中国不想对每一个美国的要求都说‘是’。”
  
  Accommodation is easy when that means letting China do what America wants. But will
  America let China do things that it does not want? The shadow overhanging America’s
  engagement policy is that China will not change enough to satisfy America and America
  will not yield enough to satisfy China. That may sound abstract, but it could at any time
  become brutally real, either on the Korean Peninsula or across the Taiwan Strait.
  当中国做美国所希望的事的时候,容忍是容易的。但美国是否会让中国做美国不希望的事?
  笼罩在美国的“接触”政策上的阴影在于:中国的改变可能不足以让美国满意,而美国的让
  步也可能不足以让中国满意。这听起来是抽象的,但它随时可能成为残忍的现实,要么在朝
  鲜半岛,要么在台湾海峡。
楼主NileBlue 时间:2010-12-15 13:46:44
  Korean conundrum
  朝韩难题
  
  Nobody knows whether the North Korean regime will survive, nor what might come after
  Kim Jong Il and Kim Junior. But imagine for a moment that, on the death of the Dear
  Leader, North Korea descends into anarchy or lashes out, as it did in the island attack last
  month that killed South Korean servicemen and civilians. The ensuing crisis would severely
  test the capacity of China and America to live with each other.
  没有人知道朝鲜政权能否继续存在,也不知道金正日和小金之后会怎么样。想象一下,如果
  敬爱的领袖死后,朝鲜陷入无政府状态或者大打出手,就如同上个月攻击一个小岛导致韩国
  军人和平民死亡一样。接下来的危机将严重考验中、美相互适应的能力。
  
  Everyone would be worried about North Korea’s nuclear weapons. America may want to
  seize them, but China would not like American soldiers on its borders. Nor would China
  wish America or South Korea to assert control over the North, an ally and a buffer. In the
  longer run, China may expect to regain the sort of influence over a unified Korea that, as
  the dominant Asian land power, it has exercised throughout most of history.
  每个人都担心朝鲜的核武器。美国想要掌握它们,但中国不愿意美国士兵出现在边境上。中
  国也不希望美国和韩国去控制作为盟友和缓冲区的朝鲜。从长远来看,中国可能希望恢复那
  种对一个统一的朝鲜的影响力,作为居于主导地位的亚洲大陆强国,在历史的绝大部分时间
  里它都拥有这种影响力。
  
  This raises a host of questions. Would America trust China to mop up North Korea’s
  plutonium and enriched uranium? Would China accept the idea that South Korean troops
  should re-establish order in the North? Would it allow Korean reunification? If that
  happened, would America contemplate ultimately withdrawing its troops from the
  peninsula?
  这引发了一系列的问题。美国能信任中国去清除朝鲜的钚和浓缩铀吗?中国愿意接受由韩国
  军队来重建北方的秩序吗?它会让朝鲜统一吗?一旦这种情况【统一】发生,美国会考虑最
  终从半岛撤回部队吗?
  
  Depressingly little thought has been given to these questions. As far as anybody knows,
  China is not willing even to discuss them with America, because it does not want to betray
  a lack of confidence in its eccentric ally in the North. Yet, if talking about Korea is awkward
  now, it will be even more fraught in the teeth of a crisis.
  令人沮丧的是没什么人在考虑这些问题。就大家所知,中国甚至不愿意与美国讨论这些问题,
  因为它不想让古怪的北方盟友感到背叛。然而,如果现在讨论朝韩问题让人尴尬的话,到了
  危机近在眼前时就更加无可奈何了。
  
  If the two Koreas share the world’s scariest land border, the Taiwan Strait is its scariest sea
  passage. China’s insistence on reunification is absolute. The story is told of how, a few
  years back, the editor of a Shanghainese newspaper celebrated a new semiconductor
  factory in the city as the biggest in China. Because he had forgotten about Taiwan, he had
  to offer self-criticism and take a pay cut.
  如果说朝韩分享着世界上最令人恐惧的陆地边界,台湾海峡就是世界上最令人恐惧的海上通
  道。在统一问题上,中国的决心是毫无余地的。有故事说,几年前,一家上海报纸的编辑写
  文章称赞本市的一家新半导体工厂是“中国最大的”。结果因为他忘记了台湾【有更大的工
  厂】而被迫检讨,并接受降薪的处分。
  【译者评:台湾海峡比霍尔木兹海峡更令人恐惧?】
  
  However, rather than beat Taiwan with a stick, China these days spoons it honey instead.
  Hundreds of flights a month link the mainland to Taipei. The free-trade agreement with
  Taiwan signed this summer included measures to help Taiwanese farmers, who tend to
  support the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). China has recently
  hinted that it might one day be willing to point its missiles away from Taiwan.
  然而,近来中国并没有抡起大棒痛打台湾,而是给台湾喂蜂蜜。每个月数以百计的航班把大
  陆和台北连接起来。今年夏天与台湾签署的自由贸易协议包括了帮助台湾农民的措施,这些
  人更倾向于支持台湾独立的民主进步党(DPP)。中国最近还暗示有一天会撤走瞄准台湾的
  导弹。
  
  For the moment the policy seems to be working. The DPP lost power in 2008. Never mind
  that its successor, the Kuomintang, is the Chinese Communist Party’s old enemy. Under Ma
  Ying-jeou, Taiwan is being pragmatic. The Taiwanese people appear to want neither to
  enrage China by seeking independence, nor to want to surrender their democracy to a
  one-party state.
  目前这一政策似乎奏效了。民进党在2008年下台。不必介意它的继任者国民党是中共的老
  对手。在马英九的领导下,台湾是务实的。台湾民众似乎既不愿意追求独立以免激怒中国,
  也不愿意放弃民主投向一党专制。
  【译者评:要么是作者,要么是台湾民众,不知道这个世界上还有“一国两制”这个词,就
  算它只是一个词而已,也足以让作者的“非此即彼”的二分法在逻辑上显得可笑。】
  
  This is just fine with America. Its arms sales to Taiwan continue, but it could just about live
  with a single China so long as unification came about peacefully. What it could not abide
  would be unification by force. Strictly, the Taiwan Relations act of 1979 does not compel
  America to come to Taiwan’s aid. However, barring egregious provocation of China by
  Taiwan, America would have little choice but to intervene. If America just stood by, it would
  lose the trust of its allies across the world.
  美国觉得这样很好。它还在向台湾出售武器,但如果统一是和平的,美国也是可以容忍的一
  个完整的中国的。它不能容忍的是武力统一。严格说来,1979年的《台湾关系法》并不强
  迫美国来帮助台湾。然而,如果中国异乎寻常地对台湾挑衅,美国将别无选择只有介入。如
  果美国只是袖手旁观,它将失去世界各地的盟国的信赖。
  
  Taiwan remains a flashpoint. Taiwanese democracy could lead to a desire for independence,
  Chinese nationalism could make reunification more urgent, and America could be afraid of
  appearing weak. Even now, when the mood is good, the island is a test of Chinese and
  American restraint. America needs to be clear that it will not be manipulated: Taiwan
  cannot rashly bid for independence on the assumption that America will protect it. China
  needs to understand that coercion would destroy its credentials with the rest of the world.
  America does not expect China to renounce its aims; it does expect China to satisfy them
  within the system.
  台湾仍然是导火索。台湾的民主可能导致独立的愿望,中国的民族主义可能让统一越来越迫
  切,美国可能不愿意显得软弱。即使是现在,当情况很好时,这个岛屿还是一个考验中国和
  美国的约束力的地方。美国需要澄清的是自己不会被操控:台湾不能基于“美国将保护它”
  的前提而轻率地独立。中国需要明白逼迫【台湾】将破坏它在世界其它地方的信誉。美国不
  要求中国放弃其目的,它只是希望中国按照系统内的方式达到目的。
  
  Policymakers often sneer at diplomats for their compromises and half-truths. Yet the high
  calling of diplomacy is to find antidotes to the rivalries that poison geopolitics. Not since
  the 19th century have they had as great a task as managing the relationship between
  China and America. In Mr Obama’s administration they have a name for this: “strategic
  reassurance”.
  决策者往往因为外交官的妥协和真假参半的话而嘲笑他们。然而外交的崇高使命是为毒害地
  缘政治的对抗找到解毒药。自19世纪以来,对他们而言还没有一项比调解中、美之间的关
  系更伟大的任务。在奥巴马政府中,他们给这个任务起了一个名字:“战略安抚”。
楼主NileBlue 时间:2010-12-15 13:48:19
  原文链接:http://www.economist.com/node/17601443
  
  A special report on China’s place in the world
  Strategic reassurance
  Many things could worsen relations between China and America. Here are ten ways to
  make them better
  关于中国在世界上的地位的特别报告(五)
  战略安抚
  有许多事情可能会恶化中、美之间的各种关系。这里有十个办法使它们变得更好
  
  
  BIDING your time and hiding your powers makes sense if you are a weak country that
  expects to become strong. Eventually, though, you will want to take advantage of the
  opportunities that your new power has created. Has that moment arrived for China? Its
  military power is, globally, no match for America’s. But the PLA is beginning to deny
  America’s 65-year dominion over the Western Pacific. Fuelled by nationalist opinion, a
  debate is under way within China’s elite over whether now is the time for the country to
  stand up. This will influence China’s leaders, even though the signs are that for the time
  being they would prefer to concentrate on economic growth and their huge domestic
  problems.
  如果你是一个弱小而希望变得强大的国家,那么等待你的时机、隐藏你的实力是有道理的。
  不过,终究你会想利用因你的新实力而创造出来的一些机会。对于中国,这一时刻到来了吗?
  其军事力量,在全球范围内来说,不是美军的对手。但中国人民解放军开始不承认美国对西
  太平洋长达65年的主宰地位了。受民族主义的鼓动,中国的高层正在讨论是否现在是国家
  挺身而出的时候了。这将影响中国的领导人,尽管迹象显示他们现在宁愿专注于经济增长和
  众多的国内问题。
  
  The outside world is suspicious of China and worried about what sort of power it will turn
  out to be. Asian countries are torn between looking to China for their wealth and turning to
  America for their security. If China throws its weight around, they will vigorously resist.
  外面的世界对于中国是疑心重重的,担心它将会变成一种怎样的大国。亚洲国家在期望中国
  的财富与转向美国寻求安全两者之间难以取舍。如果中国滥用它的实力,它们会激烈地抗拒
  的。
  
  America feels increasingly vulnerable, too. Its armed forces have identified the threat in
  the Pacific. Its economic diplomacy has become aggressive and unpredictable. This further
  complicates America’s China policy, an uneasy and potentially confusing combination of
  engagement and hedging.
  美国也越来越感觉自己并不是坚不可摧。中国的武装力量已在太平洋上确认了威胁。中国的
  经济外交变得具有侵略性、难以预测。这进一步复杂化了美国的对华政策,一种不安、可能
  导致混乱的“接触”与“对冲”的混合物。
  
  That makes for a highly dangerous mix of forces. After a decade in which America was
  distracted by terror and China preoccupied with economic growth, China’s foreign relations
  are now likely to become more difficult. The risk has been underlined in the past few
  months by a series of disputes, with Japan over some islands, over the sinking of the
  Cheonan, and over claims to China’s coastal waters.
  这将导致各种力量非常危险地混杂在一起。在美国忙于对付恐怖和中国忙于经济增长的十年
  之后,中国外交关系现在可能变得更加困难。这种危机在过去的几个月里由一系列纠纷体现
  出来:在一些岛屿上与日本的纠纷、关于“天安号”沉没的纠纷,以及关于中国的海洋主权
  的纠纷。
  
  Those one-off rows must not be allowed to frame China’s relations with the rest of the
  world. Yet each assumes inordinate significance, because of the fear that China will be
  aggressive and the suspicion in China that America means to block its rise. Every incident is
  seen as a test of what will come next.
  这些过去就算过去了的争吵,不应限制中国与世界其他国家的关系。然而,每个事件都承担
  着无法估量的意义,因为【美国】会担心中国变得具有侵略性,而中国则怀疑美国要设法阻
  止它的崛起。每个事件都被视为一个后果难以预料的考验。
楼主NileBlue 时间:2010-12-15 13:50:26
  Prevention, not cure
  预防,而不是治疗
  
  The solution is to find ways to minimise the mutual mistrust between China and America.
  This will be difficult but not hopeless. China is not looking for new colonies and it has no
  ideology to export. It shares many American aims: stability, nuclear non-proliferation and,
  most of all, a thriving world economy. These goals are best served by peace.
  解决的办法是找到办法来尽量减低中、美之间的互不信任。这是困难的,但并非无望的。中
  国不寻求新的殖民地,它不输出意识形态。中国和美国有很多共同目标:稳定、核不扩散,
  以及最重要的,一个繁荣的世界经济。实现这些目标最好的方法是和平。
  
  Mistrust feeds upon mistrust, aggression upon aggression. In geopolitics, as in life, the
  best medicine is prophylactic. If ever the relationship falls into antagonism, it will be hard
  to pull back. The leaders of America and China talk volubly about their desire for good
  superpower relations. If they mean what they say, here are ten goals to aim for:
  不信任引发不信任,侵略性引发侵略性。在地缘政治里,和生活里一样,最好的药是预防。
  如果关系一旦陷入对抗,就难以恢复了。美国和中国的领导人大谈特谈,希望超级大国之间
  保持好的关系。如果他们说的是真心话,这里有十个值得追求的目标:
  
  • China needs to be certain of having a nuclear second strike. As Robert Art of Brandeis
  University argues, both China and America will feel more confident if they know their
  homelands are secure. China has been spending money to ensure that it could answer a
  first strike. America should willingly surrender this military advantage because it is
  destabilising—and instability frustrates the overriding policy aim, which is China’s peaceful
  rise.
  • 中国需要确保有第二次核打击的能力。正如布兰德斯大学的罗伯特•阿特所说:中国和美
  国如果知道它们的本土是安全的,将更有自信。中国一直在花钱确保它能抵挡住第一次打击。
  美国应自愿放弃它的军事优势,因为这将导致不稳定——而不稳定会挫败首要的政策目标,
  即中国的和平崛起。
  【译者评:又见MAD。提出这种想法的人至少60岁了。】
  
  • America should seek to maintain military superiority in the Western Pacific. For the sake
  of all its Asian alliances, the United States must be able to guarantee the sea lanes and to
  present a credible threat that it will come to Taiwan’s aid against a Chinese attack. For the
  time being, it still can. But to retain that advantage, America will need to harden its forward
  bases, invest in missile defence and submarines and counter China’s capacity in
  asymmetric electronic, cyber and space warfare. This will inevitably add to Chinese
  insecurity. On the other hand it will add to the security of China’s neighbours. Just now that
  is more important.
  • 美国应该寻求保持在西太平洋上的军事优势。为了所有的亚洲盟友,美国必须能够保证海
  上航线【的安全】,保证一种可信的威胁,即当中国攻击台湾时,它会来帮助台湾。目前,
  它还能做到这一点。但是要保持这种优势,美国需要加强前哨基地、投资于导弹防御和潜艇,
  以及应对中国在不对称电子战、网络战和空间战的能力。这将不可避免地增加中国的不安全
  感。另一方面,它会增加中国的邻国的安全感。后者是当前更为重要的事。
  
  • China needs to share more of its nuclear and conventional military doctrine with America.
  Compared with the elaborate cold-war communication between America and the Soviet
  Union, China and America do not talk. Military-to-military links were among the first things
  to go when America sold arms to Taiwan earlier this year, just as they were in 2001 when
  Donald Rumsfeld, then secretary of defence, severed them after that mid-air collision.
  Military-to-military contacts are not a reward for good behaviour but an essential part of
  building trust.
  • 中国需要与美国分享更多的核军备与常规军备的军事方针。与冷战时美国和苏联之间的细
  致的沟通渠道不同,中、美之间没有对话。当今年早些时候美国向台湾出售武器时,两国军
  队之间的直接联系是最先中断的联系之一,一如2001年的空中撞机事件发生后,时任国防
  部长的唐纳德•拉姆斯菲尔德同样首先切断了两军之间的联系。军队之间的直接联系并非是
  对做好事的奖励,而是建立互信的一个重要组成部分。
  
  • Asia needs rules to help prevent maritime disputes from escalating. Collisions at sea, for
  instance, are much easier to manage if the rules have been set out beforehand. Collisions
  are less likely to happen at all if a code determines what counts as a safe passage. In 2002
  ASEAN and China signed an agreement encouraging good behaviour in the South China
  Sea, but it has been neglected. Only after the recent fuss did China show a renewed
  interest.
  • 亚洲需要一些规则来防止海上纠纷进一步升级。比如说,海上的碰撞,如果事先确立了规
  则就很容易管理了。如果有条例规定了怎样算是安全通过,那么碰撞是不太可能发生的。中
  国与东盟在2002年签署了一项协议,鼓励在南中国海上的良好行为,但它已被完全忽视了。
  只是在最近的一次大惊小怪之后,中国才显示出新的兴趣。
  【译者评:这一条似乎是专门针对今年的钓鱼岛撞船事件而提出的,不过过于肤浅。】
  
  • America and China need to talk now about the things that look likely to lead to disputes
  later on. That means contingencies for North Korea—in secret if necessary. As Kenneth
  Lieberthal, of the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC, argues, it also means talking
  about such issues as space and cyber-warfare. The two countries have put a lot of work
  into their Strategic and Economic Dialogue, but this tends to be dominated by the news of
  the moment. It should focus on the future.
  • 美国和中国现在就需要对以后很可能导致争议的问题展开对话。这里的问题是指朝鲜的那
  些偶发事件——如果必要的话就秘密地谈。华盛顿的布鲁金斯研究所的肯尼思•利伯塔尔【中
  文名李侃如】认为,这也意味着对空间战、网络战等问题展开对话。这两个国家在战略经济
  对话中投入了很多精力,但这个对话倾向于谈当前发生的事件。它应该着眼于未来。
  
  • America should abide by its own rules—and if it must break them, it should factor in the
  real cost of doing so. America wants China to be prepared to live with the world as it is. If
  it breaks the rules, it will feed suspicions in China that, one way or the other, its rise will be
  denied. In terms of security, keeping the rules means avoiding actions that, in Mr Art’s
  words, appear “punitive and unprovoked”. In economics it means avoiding protectionism,
  which is doubly self-defeating as it both undermines China’s faith in the system and makes
  America poorer and less able to defend itself.
  • 美国应该遵守自己确立的规则——如果必须打破它们,它应该计算这样做所需的真正成
  本。美国希望中国准备好和现有世界共处【译者注:即遵守世界的现有秩序】。如果美国破
  坏规则,这将增加中国的怀疑,即怀疑其崛起将遭到或明或暗的抵制。在安全方面,用阿特
  先生的话说,遵守规则意味着要避免看起来“睚眦必报的、无缘无故的”行动。在经济方面,
  这意味着要避免保护主义,保护主义是双重的得不偿失,它既削弱了中国对系统的信任,也
  损害美国的经济,更加难以保护自己。
  
  • The Chinese Communist Party should stop using censors and commentators to spread a
  virulent form of nationalism. Its leaders will find foreign relations easier to manage if they
  draw less on historic grievances. That will be hard for the party, which craves the
  legitimacy that comes from having seen off Westerners and the Japanese. But it should
  eschew resentment if it wants China to co-exist easily with the rest of the world.
  • 中国共产党应该停止用新闻监察员和评论员来传播一种充满敌意的民族主义。它的领导人
  将会发现如果他们不再诉诸于历史上屈辱,外交关系会更容易管理。对于党来说这是困难的,
  因为它珍视由于自己赶走了西方人和日本人而得到的合法性。但是如果它希望中国更容易地
  与世界其它国家相处,它就应该避开怨恨。
  【译者评:又来了,这是在暗示:西方+日本=世界其他国家?非洲和南美洲沉入海底了?
  “充满敌意的民族主义”?要说由于历史上的屈辱而产生的敌意,似乎国人的敌意比较集中
  于日、俄。而目前和俄国关系不错,那么所谓“外交关系会更容易管理”,大概只是指中日
  关系吧。而中日关系的恶化,完全是因为中国的民族主义?还记得小泉么?】
  
  • China and America should try to do as much business as they can through multinational
  forums, such as the G20 and the United Nations. Bilateral dealings are easier and less
  time-consuming. But they are opaque and they leave the rest of Asia wondering what is
  really going on. Nothing builds the capacity of the system as does using it successfully.
  • 中、美应该尽量多地通过多边渠道来合作,比如二十国集团和联合国。双边渠道比较方便
  而且比较省时。但双边渠道是不透明的,会让亚洲其它国家不明究里。对于系统而言,成功
  地使用它就是在增加它的能力。
  
  • Asia needs to sort out the thicket of regional-security organisations. With America and
  Russia set to join as full members next year, the East Asia Summit looks the most
  promising place to become the region’s security forum. That will take a leap of faith from
  countries like Singapore, which has a special place in ASEAN. However, Asia needs to put
  collective security first for once.
  • 亚洲需要对各种各样的区域安全组织来一次大清理。随着美国和俄罗斯明年将成为正式成
  员,东亚峰会看起来最有前途成为【主要的】区域安全论坛。对有些国家而言这需要下不小
  的决心,比如在东盟中有特殊地位的新加坡。然而,亚洲这一次需要将集体安全摆在第一位。
  
  • Asian countries should put more effort into non-traditional security. According to
  Katherine Morton, of the Australian National University, a lot of work is to be done in such
  areas as climate change, health, the environment, piracy and terrorism, where threats by
  their nature cross borders. Just as important, however, non-traditional security presents a
  chance for Asia’s military forces to learn how to work together without the usual
  tensions—as when China sent its ships to help an international naval force prevent piracy in
  the Gulf of Aden. Some Asian countries are squeamish about the effect of non-traditional
  security on their sovereignty. They should swallow hard.
  • 亚洲国家应该在非传统安全领域付出更大的努力。根据澳大利亚国立大学的凯瑟琳•莫顿
  的研究,有很多工作要做,诸如气候变化、卫生、环境、盗版以及恐怖主义,这些威胁从本
  质上就是跨国界的。另外,同样重要的是,非传统安全领域提供了一个机会,让亚洲的军队
  学习如何合作,而不是平时的紧张状态——正如中国派出军舰帮助在亚丁湾打击海盗的国际
  海上力量。一些亚洲国家对其领土上的非传统安全问题吹毛求疵。他们将来会吞下一个大苦
  果。
作者:该用户名不能注册 时间:2010-12-15 13:51:45
  
  
  woo,直播。果断马克。
  
  
  
楼主NileBlue 时间:2010-12-15 13:52:02
  Time to choose
  选择的时刻
  
  After King Goujian won his famous victory over the kingdom to the north, he so revelled in
  his power that he turned into something of a despot. One faithful adviser fled for his life,
  another fell on his sword at the king’s command. In the 1980s some Chinese writers saw
  this as an allegory for the cruelty of the triumphant Mao Zedong.
  在勾践赢得了对北方邻国的辉煌胜利之后,他陶醉于自己的权力,变成了一个暴君。一位忠
  实的顾问为了自保而逃走了,另一个在国王逼迫下自杀。上世纪80年代一些中国作家认为
  这个故事可以对应于毛泽东在胜利之后的残酷行为。
  
  There are many interpretations of King Goujian’s story. It can stand for vengeance,
  despotism, self-improvement and much else. Likewise, China’s rise is neither guaranteed to
  be chiefly about the prosperity of 1.3 billion people nor condemned to be about
  antagonism or conflict with the rest of the world. The future, like the story, is what we
  make it.
  对于勾践王的故事有很多解读。它可以代表复仇、专制、自我完善和其它等等。同样地,中
  国的崛起【的结果】可能是13亿人民的繁荣,也可能是与世界上其它地方的对抗与冲突。
  未来,正如这个故事,在于我们的选择。
作者:浮木于水 时间:2010-12-15 13:52:55
  看的想吐,中国人不要忘记鸦片战争,第二次鸦片战争,中日甲午战争,八国联军,日俄战争,八年抗战,更不要忘记美国佬把飞机开到鸭绿江边。为什么强调中国进入他们的秩序?人类历史以来中国才是秩序的建立者和维护者,现在我们只是拿回本来就属于我们的东西。
楼主NileBlue 时间:2010-12-15 13:54:11
  原文链接:http://www.economist.com/node/17601487
  
  A special report on China’s place in the world
  The fourth modernisation
  China is becoming a military force to reckon with in the western Pacific. How should
  America respond?
  关于中国在世界上的地位的特别报告(六)
  第四个现代化
  中国正在成为在西太平洋值得注意的军事力量。美国该如何应对呢?
  
  
  THIRTY-FIVE years ago Deng Xiaoping accused the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of
  “bloating, laxity, conceit, extravagance and inertia”. Even so, three years later, when he set
  about modernising China, he put the PLA last in the queue, behind farming, industry and
  science. And when the commander of the navy in 1982 laid out his plans for China to
  become a world sea power, he did not expect his goal to be realised before 2040.
  35年前邓小平批评中国人民解放军(PLA)“臃肿、松弛、自负、铺张、不思进取”。即便如
  此,三年后,当他开始对中国现代化时,他仍然把解放军放在农业、工业和科学之后。当海
  军的负责人在1982年制定让中国成为世界海军强国的计划时,他不指望这个目标在2040
  年前能实现。
  
  Later military modernisation became more of a priority, thanks to two demonstrations of
  American firepower. First, America’s use of precision weapons in Operation Desert Storm
  during the first Gulf war convinced China that it could no longer base its defence on the
  weight of numbers. Second, when the PLA was hectoring Taiwan with missile tests in 1996,
  President Bill Clinton ordered two aircraft-carrier strike groups into the region, one of them
  headed by the provocatively named USS Independence. China had to back down.
  后来,由于美国两次显示了自己军力,军事现代化变得越来越重要。首先,在第一次海湾战
  争的沙漠风暴行动中美国使用的精确制导武器,让中国确信自己的防御不能再基于数量。第
  二,当1996年解放军进行针对台湾的、虚张声势的导弹试验时,比尔•克林顿总统命令两
  个航母攻击群进入该地区,其中一个攻击群由名字具有挑衅性的“独立”号航母领头。中国
  只得退让。
  【译者评:不知道这里的“中国只得退让”指的是什么。是指中国放弃了对台作战吗?可当
  时的试射导弹并不是进攻台湾的炮火准备哦。】
  
  The collapse of the Soviet Union had persuaded China’s leaders that an arms race with the
  world’s only superpower could squander enough money to pose a threat to the party’s grip.
  To challenge America head on made no sense. Instead China put its efforts into affordable
  “asymmetric” weapons.
  苏联的解体让中国领导人意识到与世界上唯一的超级大国展开军备竞赛,投入的资源将多得
  足以削弱党的控制力。正面挑战美国是没有意义的。因此中国将精力投入负担得起的“不对
  称”武器。
  
  This unorthodox strategy has made the PLA’s progress harder to measure. Western opinion
  is deeply divided. Military analysts are alarmed at what they see as a growing threat to
  American maritime supremacy in the western Pacific. China security specialists tend to
  scoff at all the scaremongering. Who is right?
  这个离经叛道的战略让解放军的进步越发难以考量。西方的观点发生了严重的分裂。军事分
  析家们认为美国在西太平洋的海上霸主地位受到了日益增加的威胁。而中国安全专家们倾向
  于把这种观点嗤之为散布谣言。谁是对的呢?
  
  Three areas of the PLA’s modernisation stand out. First, China has created what the
  Pentagon calls “the most active land-based ballistic- and cruise-missile programme in the
  world”. The Second Artillery has about 1,100 short-range ballistic missiles facing Taiwan
  and has been extending their range and improving their accuracy and payload. The Second
  Artillery is also improving its medium-range ballistic missiles, able to carry either
  conventional or nuclear warheads. The PLA has deployed several hundred air- and
  land-launched long-range cruise missiles. And it is developing the world’s first anti-ship
  ballistic missile, fitted with a manoeuvrable re-entry vehicle for added menace.
  解放军的现代化建设在三个领域脱颖而出。第一,中国创造了五角大楼称为“世界上最活跃
  的陆基弹道导弹、巡航导弹计划”。第二炮兵拥有大约1100枚针对台湾的短程弹道导弹,
  近来已提升了这些导弹的射程、精度和负载。第二炮兵还提升了其中程弹道导弹,使它们既
  可装载核弹头,也可装载常规弹头。解放军部署了几百枚空基、陆基远程巡航导弹。它还正
  在发展世界上第一个反舰弹道导弹,配有一个可机动的再入投送装置,以应对其它威胁。
  【译者注:“再入/re-entry”应该指导弹可以在大气层之外飞行,然后重新进入大气层。】
  
  Second, China has transformed and enlarged its submarine fleet, which can now berth in
  the newly completed base on Hainan Island, just off China’s southern coast. In the eight
  years to 2002 China bought 12 Russian Kilo-class submarines, a big improvement on its
  own noisy Ming- and Romeo-class boats. Since then the PLA navy has been introducing
  longer-range and stealthier Chinese designs, including the nuclear-powered Jin class,
  which carries ballistic missiles, and the Shang class, a nuclear-powered attack submarine.
  China has about 66 submarines against America’s 71, though the American boats are
  superior. By 2030, according to the Kokoda Foundation, an Australian think-tank, China
  could have 85-100 submarines.
  第二,中国升级并扩充了它的潜艇舰队,目前可停泊在中国南部海岸附近的海南岛上新落成
  的基地。2002年之前的8年,中国购买了12艘俄罗斯的“基洛”级潜艇,比起自己的噪
  声较大的“明”级、“Romeo”级潜艇来是一大进步。从那时起,解放军海军开始引入中国
  自己设计的、航程更远、隐蔽性更好潜艇,包括可携带弹道导弹的、核动力的“晋”级,以
  及核动力的“商”级攻击潜艇。相比美国的71艘,中国有大约66艘潜艇,不过美国潜艇
  的性能要更好。据一个澳大利亚的智囊团科科达基金会估计,到2030年,中国可能拥有85
  到100艘潜艇。
  
  And third, China has concentrated on what it calls “informatisation”, a tongue-twister that
  Jiang Zemin coined in 2002 to describe how the PLA needs to function as one force, using
  sensors, communications and electronic and cyber-warfare. China now has a good idea of
  what is going on far into the Pacific, thanks to a combination of satellites, over-the-horizon
  radar, medium-range surface-wave radars, reconnaissance drones and underwater-sensor
  arrays.
  第三,中国已经把力量集中在所谓的“信息化”,江泽民在2002年创造的一个拗口的词【译
  者注:informatisation确实有点绕口】,用来描述解放军需要运用探测设备、通信、电子设
  备和网络战,结合为一体进行战争。借助一整套包括卫星、超视距雷达、中程地波雷达、无
  人驾驶侦察机和水下探测阵列的组合,中国现在对太平洋深处发生的事情可以说了如指掌。
  
  China has also been working on anti-satellite weapons. American satellites have been
  “dazzled” by lasers fired from the ground. And in 2007 a ballistic missile launched from
  Xichang space centre in Sichuan blew up a broken weather satellite—no mean feat, though
  other countries were furious because it produced more than 35,000 new pieces of space
  debris.
  中国同时也在研究反卫星武器。美国卫星曾遭遇了地面上发射的激光的“眩照”(dazzled)。
  2007年,位于四川的西昌太空中心发射的一枚弹道导弹击毁了一颗损坏的气象卫星——此
  举相当可观,尽管很多其它国家也对因此产生的35000块新的太空碎片非常不满。
  
  Chinese hackers have been busy, too. In March last year Canadian researchers discovered
  a spy network containing more than 1,300 computers, many of them in China, that had got
  into governments’ systems. Taiwanese and Western targets suffered from severe Chinese
  cyber-attacks at least 35 times in the decade to 2009, according to Northrop Grumman, an
  American defence contractor. The Pentagon concedes that it is not sure the PLA was
  behind such attacks, but argues that “authoritative” analysts in the PLA see cyber-warfare
  as important.
  中国的黑客们也在忙碌着。去年3月,加拿大的研究者们发现了一个包括1300台计算机的
  间谍网络,已经侵入了政府系统,该网络中很多台计算机就在中国。根据一家美国防务承包
  商,诺斯罗普•格鲁曼公司的研究,从本世纪开始到2009年为止,台湾和西方的目标已经
  遭到了至少35次来自中国的强烈网络攻击。五角大楼承认,不能确定这些攻击与解放军有
  关,但是它坚称解放军中的“权威”分析家非常看重网络战的重要性。
作者:浮木于水 时间:2010-12-15 13:55:34
  中国人受够了老外一边跟你做生意一边背后捅上一刀,不管是JY还是FQ都要明白,人类历史上中国人是老大占了99%的时间。让老外闭嘴的方式就是我们用强大的power。
作者:浮木于水 时间:2010-12-15 13:57:16
  我个人而言,我受够了白人道貌岸然的样子。是时候反击这些杂种的时候了!
楼主NileBlue 时间:2010-12-15 13:57:42
  The new arsenal
  新的军火库
  
  What does this amount to? Military experts in America, Australia and Japan think China’s
  new arsenals are a greater threat than its higher-profile plans to launch aircraft-carriers in
  the next decade or so. Alan Dupont, of the University of Sydney in Australia, says that
  “missiles and cyber-equivalents are becoming the weapons of choice for the conventionally
  outgunned.”
  这意味着什么?美国、澳大利亚和日本的军事专家认为,相比其高调宣称的今后十年左右时
  间内将建成航母的计划,中国的新的军火库更有威胁性。澳大利亚的悉尼大学的阿兰•杜邦
  说,“对于传统意义上的军事弱国来说,导弹和网络武器是最好的选择。”
  
  According to the Centre for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), an American
  research institute, Chinese firepower threatens America’s Asian bases, which until now
  have been safe from all but nuclear attack. The Second Artillery’s missiles could swamp the
  bases’ defences and destroy runways as well as large numbers of fighters and ships. Japan
  is already within range of Chinese missiles, many of them currently pointing at Taiwan.
  Guam soon will be (see chart 1).
  根据美国的研究机构,战略和预算评估中心(CSBA)的报告,中国的军力威胁到了美国在
  亚洲的基地,这些基地至今为止可以抵御除核武器之外的所有攻击。第二炮兵的导弹能够饱
  和攻击这些基地的防御,摧毁跑道以及大量的战斗机和舰艇。日本已经在中国导弹的射程之
  内,大量导弹正在瞄准台湾,关岛也在不久之后会被纳入目标范围(见图1)。
  【译者不会在天涯上贴图,所以只能给出图片的链接:
  
  
  China’s submarines, missiles and anti-ship cruise missiles threaten America’s
  aircraft-carrier strike groups within 1,000 to 1,600 nautical miles of the Chinese coast.
  According to Ross Babbage, an Australian defence analyst and founder of the Kokoda
  Foundation, if China had an anti-ship ballistic missile, coming in fast and without much
  warning, it would be even harder to defend against. And China’s space and cyber-weapons
  could serve as what Chinese planners label an “assassin’s mace” in a surprise attack
  designed to smash America’s elaborate but fragile electronic networks. That would leave
  American forces half-blind and mute, and its bases and carriers more vulnerable still.
  中国的潜艇、导弹和反舰巡航导弹能在距离中国海岸线1000至1600海里【译者注:约合
  1800公里至3000公里】的范围内威胁到美国的航母攻击群。据澳大利亚防务分析家、科
  科达基金会创始人之一的罗斯•巴加基的研究,如果中国拥有反舰弹道导弹,用来进行出其
  不意地快速袭击,那么将更加难以防范。在奇袭美国的复杂但脆弱的电子网络时,中国的空
  间武器和网络武器可以成为中国决策者标榜的“杀手锏”。这会使美国的军力陷入半失明和
  无法沟通的状态,它的基地和航母将更容易被攻击。
  
  In sum, China’s abilities to strike have soared far beyond seeking to deter American
  intervention in any future mainland dispute with Taiwan. Today China can project power
  out from its coastline well beyond the 12-mile (19km) limit that the Americans once
  approached without a second thought. Mr Okamoto, the Japanese security expert, believes
  China’s strategy is to have “complete control” of what planners call the First Island Chain.
  Ultimately, China seems to want to stop the American fleet from being able to secure its
  interests in the western Pacific.
  总之,中国的攻击力已经远远超过了阻止美国干涉大陆在未来任何时间内与台湾发生冲突的
  能力。如今,中国有能力在远远超过其海岸线12英里(19公里)以外的范围发射武器,而
  美国曾经可以在这个范围内随意出入。日本安全专家冈本先生相信,中国的战略是“完全控
  制”其所谓的第一岛链。最终,中国希望阻止美国舰队在西太平洋保护自己的利益。
  
  America’s most senior officials have taken note. Last year Robert Gates, the defence
  secretary, gave warning that “investments [of countries like China] in cyber- and
  anti-satellite warfare, anti-air and anti-ship weaponry and ballistic missiles could threaten
  America’s primary way to project power and help allies in the Pacific—in particular our
  forward air bases and carrier strike groups.”
  美国的最高官员已经对此开始关注。去年,国防部长罗伯特•盖茨警告说:“(中国这样的国
  家)在任何网络武器、反卫星武器、防空、反舰武器和弹道导弹的投入都会威胁到美国投送
  军力以及帮助太平洋上的盟国——尤其是对于我们的前哨的空军基地和航母攻击群。”
  
  Mr Babbage is blunter: “Current defence planning is invalid,” he says. He and the analysts
  at CSBA argue that America needs to rethink its strategy in the Pacific. It should strengthen
  its bases and be able to disrupt Chinese attacks with decoys and by spreading aircraft and
  ships around the region. American forces must have better logistics and be able to fight
  even when their information networks are impaired. Crucially, they must be in a position to
  disable China’s electronic reconnaissance, surveillance and battle-damage assessment,
  some of which is protected by a system of tunnels beyond easy reach of American
  weapons.
  巴加基先生更加直言不讳:“目前的防御计划是徒劳的”,他如是说。他和CSBA的分析家们
  认为,美国需要重新考虑其在太平洋上的战略。它应该加强它的基地,可以通过诱饵和在此
  区域部署航母和舰艇来阻止中国的攻击。美军必须加强后勤,并在信息网络被损坏的情况下
  能够继续战斗。最重要的是,他们必须能够摧毁中国的电子侦查、监控和战斗损伤评估装置,
  而这些中的一部分由一个通道系统保护起来,美军的武器想要破坏它们绝非易事。
作者:frankypfan 时间:2010-12-15 13:59:30
  膜拜大作~
楼主NileBlue 时间:2010-12-15 14:01:45
  Pacific in name only
  不太平的太平洋
  
  Critics say the cold warriors are suffering from a bad case of “enemy-deprivation
  syndrome”. For a start, the impression that China’s defence spending has soared is
  misleading. The PLA’s budget has broadly kept pace with GDP in the past decade, after two
  decades in which its share of GDP fell (see chart 2). Experts differ about the size of China’s
  defence budget, which is only partly disclosed. Sam Perlo-Freeman, of the Stockholm
  International Peace Research Institute, puts overall spending in 2009 at $99 billion in 2008
  dollars, though some estimates are higher and the official total is only $70 billion. The
  United States is planning to spend $663 billion. As a share of GDP, China spends less than
  half the American figure and less than it did at the start of the 1990s. “There is not much
  evidence of an arms race,” says Mr Perlo-Freeman.
  批评家们说,冷战分子都患有一种“敌人缺失综合症”。首先,所谓中国防御支出飙升的印
  象是有误导性的。在过去的十年中,解放军的预算总体上保持了与GDP的同步增长,而之
  前的二十年其占GDP的比例是逐渐减少的(见图2)。专家们对中国防御预算的规模存在争
  议,因为只有部分的预算得以公开。斯德哥尔摩国际和平研究所的山姆•佩尔罗以2008年
  的美元价值计算,认为2009年的总预算为990亿美元,尽管有些人估计得更高而官方的数
  字仅为700亿美元。美国计划的【国防】预算为6630亿美元。从所占GDP的份额上看,
  中国的花费不及美国的一半,比上世纪90年代初所占比例还要少。“军备竞赛的证据是不
  充分的”,佩尔罗先生如是说。
  【译者注:美国的国防预算并不包括在伊拉克和阿富汗的美军的支出。
  图二的链接是:
  
  
  Some doubt the quality of China’s equipment. One retired American admiral says that
  much of the Russian equipment it bought was “junk”. Despite China’s progress, it lags in
  guidance and control, turbine engines, machine tools, diagnostic and forensic equipment
  and computer-aided design and manufacturing. “China has come a long way fast,” says
  Professor Dupont, “but military modernisation gets harder from here.”
  有些人对中国装备的质量表示怀疑。一位已退休的美国海军上将说,很多中国从俄罗斯买来
  的装备都是“破烂”。虽然中国在进步,但是它在制导与控制、涡轮发动机、机械工具、检
  测和分析设备、计算机辅助设计与生产方面都仍然落后。“中国是在快速地前进”,杜邦教授
  说,“但军事现代化的真正困难现在才开始。”
  【译者注:从报告最后的“致谢”中,大致可以猜到这里的“已退休的美国海军上将”应该
  是William Fallon,他曾在2005-2007年任美国太平洋司令部司令,2007-2008年任美国中
  央司令部司令。】
  
  Some have doubts about China’s manpower, too. The PLA is much more professional now
  than when it was a peasant army, but it lacks experience. Nigel Inkster, of the International
  Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), recalls one of the founders of the Chinese navy once
  telling him: “It’s not that I didn’t know much about sailing, but I hadn’t ever seen the sea.”
  有些人同样在质疑中国的人力。与从前的一支农民军队相比,解放军现在专业多了,但是它
  仍然缺乏经验。国际战略研究所的(IISS)内格尔•因克斯特回忆说,一位中国海军的创始
  人曾经告诉他:“并非我不知道怎么航海,而是我从来没有见过海。”
  
  Complex subjects like submarine warfare take years to master. “If you fight, there are
  holes,” says the IISS’s Christian Le Mière. “And until you do, you don’t know where they
  are.” The retired admiral thinks Chinese forces suffer from a lack of trust, which could slow
  them up in battle. “We give our people responsibility and initiative,” he says. “That’s
  anathema to them.”
  像潜艇战这种复杂的课题需要很多年才能掌握。“当你作战的时候,总有一些漏洞”,IISS
  的克里斯廷•勒梅尔说:“直到你亲自去做,你才知道漏洞在哪里。”那位已退休的海军上将
  认为,中国军队存在缺乏信任的问题,这一点会使它在战斗中减慢节奏。“我们授予我们的
  人更多的责任和主动权”,他说:“而他们对此深恶痛绝。”
  
  Robert Ross, a professor at Harvard, argues that the pessimists overestimate China’s threat
  and underestimate America’s powers. The United States is better able to track the other
  side’s submarines; it is superior in cyber-warfare and less vulnerable than China in
  space—if only because it has built-in redundancy. China would struggle to penetrate the
  countermeasures and electronic camouflage that protect American ships. Carlyle Thayer, of
  the Australian Defence Force Academy, notes that it has already deployed 31 of its 53
  fast-attack submarines and three Ohio class nuclear submarines to the Pacific.
  哈佛大学教授罗伯特•罗斯认为,悲观主义者高估了中国的威胁,低估了美国的实力。美国
  能够更好地对对方的潜艇进行追踪;美国与中国相比,在网络战上更占优势,在太空中更不
  易受到攻击,单单凭美国设备内在的冗余设计就可以这样说。中国想要渗入保护美国军舰的
  反制措施和电子伪装将非常困难。澳大利亚国防学院的卡莱尔•萨耶注意到,美国已经在太
  平洋上部署了其53艘快速攻击潜艇中的31艘,另外还有3艘“俄亥俄”级核潜艇。
  
  For all the uncertainties in this debate, three things are beyond dispute. First, China has
  already forced American ships to think about how and when they approach the Chinese
  coast. The closer American vessels come, the more missiles and submarines they face and
  the less time they would have to react to a strike. Anyone sailing a carrier worth $15
  billion-20 billion with a crew of 6,000 would think twice about taking on that extra risk. To
  deny America possession of seas it has dominated for decades, China does not need to
  control its own coastal waters; it just has to be able to threaten American ships there.
  Hugh White, a former Australian security and defence official, foresees the western Pacific
  becoming a “naval no-go zone”.
  在这场论战中所有的不确定因素中,有三件事是毋庸置疑的。第一,中国已经迫使美国舰队
  考虑怎样以及何时靠近中国的海岸。美国的舰艇越接近,他们就会面临越多的导弹和潜艇,
  他们对攻击做出反应的时间就会越短。任何一位驾驶着一艘价值150至200亿美元、装载
  6000名船员的航母的人,都会再三考虑是否需要冒这个风险。为了反对美国已经主宰了几
  十年的海洋所有权,中国并不需要控制自己的近海,它只需在那里能够威胁到美国的舰艇。
  一位前澳大利亚安全与防务官员休•怀特预测,西太平洋将成为一片“海军禁区”。
  
  Second, China’s ability to project power is improving. Its submarines, fighter aircraft,
  missiles, and cyber- and electronic warfare, once poor, now pose a threat. China’s weapons
  will continue to improve, and its forces will gather experience. Provided that the economy
  does not fall over, budgets will grow, too, absolutely and possibly as a share of GDP. Other
  things being equal, China can project power into its backyard more easily than America can
  project power across the Pacific Ocean. At risk is what Mr Gates has called “the operational
  sanctuary our navy has enjoyed in the western Pacific for the better part of six decades”.
  第二,中国投送武力的能力正在提高。那些一度简陋的潜艇、战斗机、导弹以及网络战、电
  子战武器,现在已经成为了一种威胁。中国的武器将继续改进,军队将继续积累经验。如果
  经济不衰退的话,其预算的绝对数额和所占GDP的份额都会增长。在其他条件相同的情况
  下,中国在自己的后院投送军力要比美国跨越太平洋容易得多。盖茨先生所称的“美国海军
  将近六十年来在西太平洋上享受到的行动绝对自由”受到了威胁。
  【译者评:盖茨先生也不脸红,苏联还存在的时候,美国海军即使在东太平洋都不见得有很
  多“行动绝对自由”。要知道,当时苏联的潜艇比美国的潜艇要强。】
  
  Third, although the United States is able to respond to China, it will have to overcome
  some obstacles first. America’s military spending in Asia is overshadowed by the need to
  cut overall government spending and by other military priorities, such as Afghanistan.
  Jonathan Pollack, of the Brookings Institution, points out that some ideas, such as
  replacing aircraft-carriers with more submarines, would inevitably run into opposition from
  the navy and from politicians whose constituencies would suffer. “For many officers the
  navy’s core institutional identity is indelibly tied to carriers and the power-projection
  mission they perform,” he says. “Reducing their numbers is going to be a very painful
  process.” Above all, big shifts in military planning take decades: America needs to think
  now about China in 2025.
  第三,尽管美国可以反击中国,但是它必须首先克服很多障碍。美国在亚洲的军事开支并不
  乐观,受制于压缩政府预算和其他重点问题(比如阿富汗)的影响。布鲁克林研究所的乔纳
  森•波拉克指出,一些比如用更多的潜艇替代航母的想法一定会遭到海军的反对,如果影响
  到自己选区的选民,相关的政客也会反对。“对于很多军官来说,海军的核心标志毫无疑问
  地就是航母,以及它们投送军力的使命”,他说:“减少航母的数量将会是一个非常痛苦的过
  程。”总之,军队规划的大变革需要数十年的时间;而美国现在就需要考虑【如何对付】2025
  年的中国。
  
  All this points to an important principle. Military planning is framed differently from
  diplomacy. Diplomats are interested in what they think states intend to do, but military
  planners have to work with what they think states can do. Intentions change and states
  can mislead. If you are charged with defending your country, you need to be able to meet
  even improbable threats.
  所有这些都指向一个重要的原则。军队规划从根本上与外交不同。外交官们感兴趣的是国家
  想要做什么,而军事规划者必须考虑国家能做什么。意向会改变,国家可能会被误导。如果
  你被授予保护国家的责任,你得能够应对甚至不太可能出现的威胁。
  
  That logic works in China, too. America has not been shy of going to war in recent years.
  Not long ago a retired Chinese admiral likened the American navy to a man with a criminal
  record “wandering just outside the gate of a family home”. American strength in the 1990s
  made China feel insecure, so it transformed the PLA to shore up its policy on Taiwan and
  protect its economically vital coastline. Yet by adding to its own security, China has taken
  away from that of its neighbours and of the United States. Perhaps China does not mean
  ever to use its weapons aggressively. But American defence planners cannot rely on that,
  so they must respond.
  这种逻辑在中国同样适用。近年来,美国从不排斥诉诸战争。不久之前,一位退休的中国海
  军上将把美国海军比作一个有犯罪记录的人“就在家门口徘徊”。上世纪90年代美国的军
  力让中国感到不安,因此它改造了解放军,让其支撑起对台湾的政策,以及保卫关乎其经济
  命脉的海岸线。但是,通过增加自己的安全感,中国损害了其邻国和美国的安全感。也许中
  国从未想过用它的武器进行侵略。但是美国的国防规划者不能完全相信,他们必须做出回应。
  
  In this way two states that never intend harm can begin to perceive each other as growing
  threats. If you do not arm, you leave yourself open to attack. If you do, you threaten the
  other country. A British historian, Herbert Butterfield, called this the “absolute predicament
  and irreducible dilemma”. It is one reason why relations between China and America will
  probably sour.
  这样一来,两个不怀恶意的国家都将对方当作了日益增长的威胁。如果你没有武装,那么就
  要等着挨打。如果你有了武装,又会威胁到对方。一位英国历史学家赫伯特•巴特菲尔德称
  之为,“绝对的困境,无解的两难”。这就是为什么中、美关系将可能日益紧张的原因之一。
楼主NileBlue 时间:2010-12-15 14:08:23
  以上已经把文章和特别报道翻译完毕。
  以下是《经济学人》网站上各国网友对此的评论。
  评论的网址是:http://www.economist.com/node/17629709/comments#comments
  现已有评论680多条。
  由于该网站可以让读者对自己赞同的评论进行“推荐”,所以我只选择翻译
  一些被“推荐”的比较多的评论。
  
  Ignacio M. wrote:
  Dec 2nd 2010 5:13 GMT
  
  "If America wants to bind China into the rules-based liberal order it promotes, it needs to
  stick to the rules itself. Every time America breaks them—by, for instance, protectionism—it
  feeds China’s suspicions and undermines the very order it seeks."
  Or by, for instance, ignoring international bodies (say, the UN Security Council) and
  international law when wanting to invade, say, Irak or whatever.
  Pay respect to international law, to international bodies authority, and then ask for the
  same commitment to your counterparty. The alternative to the rule of law in the world, as
  would be in any national society, is chaos.
  Recommend (457)
  “如果美国想把中国带入到自己所倡导的有规矩的自由秩序中,美国自己就需要遵守这些规
  矩。每次美国打破规矩——比如保护主义——这就增加了中国的怀疑,也破坏了它所寻求的
  秩序。”
  打破规矩的方式还有,比方说,绕过国际组织(如联合国安理会)和国际法,去攻打伊拉克
  或者其它国家。
  尊重国际法,尊重国际组织的权威,然后再要求对方有同样的承诺。在世界上,如在任何国
  家的社会里一样,不讲法制只会导致混乱。
  推荐(457)
  
  salkagga wrote:
  Dec 2nd 2010 5:44 GMT
  
  If the US would get out of Taiwan’s corner, China wouldn’t attack - instead, the
  long-awaited reunification a la HK1997 would seem like a reasonable and inevitable
  alternative, and a huge sticking point in Sino-American relations would be relieved.
  Likewise with North Korea, it is not clear that the US strategy of, apparently, trying to
  frighten the DPRK into militarizing itself to death is working. US military retreat from Asia
  would probably lessen tensions, since resolution of the Taiwan and Korea conflicts would
  no longer necessarily entail US, and therefore Chinese, involvement. It seems clear that
  North Korea could never prevail in a new Korean War. They know it. Why not leave them
  alone?
  The US military’s presence in Asia is not about US security - instead, it is about keeping
  three very important markets, Taiwan, Korea, and Japan, in the US corner, and also about
  justifying the large and reasonably profitable and useful defense industry that builds and
  maintains warships, warplanes, and other weapons that are constantly cycled through the
  Asian theater.
  End of story: if the US would back out of WW2 mode in Asia, relations with China would
  only improve, not only for the US, but probably also for Japan, Taiwan, and both Koreas.
  Recommend (419)
  如果美国不管台湾,中国不会进攻——相反,如香港1997那样的等待许久的统一,似乎是
  一个有道理的、不可避免的选择,而且中美关系中一个巨大的症结就此消除了。
  对朝鲜同样如此,美国似乎想把朝鲜吓到武装自己一直到饿死,这种战略不知道有没有效。
  美军从亚洲撤出也许会减少紧张,毕竟台湾问题和朝韩冲突已经解决,美军不必待下去了,
  如此一来中国也不必卷入其中。朝鲜在一场新的朝鲜战争中似乎很明显不会取胜。他们自己
  知道这一点。别管他们,岂不是更好?
  美军在亚洲的存在不是为了美国的安全——相反,是为了把3个非常重要的市场:台湾、韩
  国、日本控制在美国手中,也是为了那些巨大的、利润丰厚且用处不菲的军工企业,这些企
  业制造、维护的战舰、战斗机以及其它武器不断地在亚洲各地耀武扬威。
  归根到底:如果美国在亚洲从二战的模式里退出来,那么对华关系就只会改善,不光是对美
  国【有利】,同样对日本、台湾和朝韩双方【有利】。
  推荐(419)
楼主NileBlue 时间:2010-12-15 14:11:03
  typingmonkey wrote:
  Dec 2nd 2010 6:05 GMT
  
  The Economist is to be commended for finally addressing this issue in a relatively
  comprehensive, rational and balanced fashion, and to see the solution in its essential
  simplicity. “The best way to turn China into an opponent is to treat it as one.”
  So I was disappointed to see the authors contradict the central thesis in the very same
  article. “Some would say the solution is for America to turn its back on military rivalry. But
  a weaker America would lead to chronic insecurity in East Asia and thus threaten the
  peaceful conduct of trade and commerce on which America’s prosperity depends. America
  therefore needs to be strong enough to guarantee the seas and protect Taiwan from
  Chinese attack.”
  I believe Einstein said “you cannot solve a problem at the same level of consciousness in
  which it was created.” So to solve the central problem of the 21st century, we are due for a
  rethink. Why, exactly, is America presumed to be the sole and just arbiter of 21st century
  security OVER THE ENTIRE PLANET? Does this not, in a global historical perspective, seem
  extraordinarily presumptuous? If we accept and welcome the growing prosperity of
  regional powers like Brazil, South Africa, India and China, why do we not accept and
  welcome their growing regional security roles? To be frank, it is simply just, rational, and
  realistic to expect a strengthening Brazil to become the watchdog for South America. It is
  simply just, rational, and realistic to expect a strengthening South Africa to become the
  watchdog for Africa. It is simply just, rational, and realistic to expect a strengthening India
  to become the watchdog for South Asia. It is simply just, rational, and realistic to expect a
  strengthening China to become the watchdog for East Asia. And it is simply just, rational,
  and realistic to expect America to remain the watchdog for North America.
  This means that each regional power can and should maintain a blue water navy and air
  force appropriate to patrol regional seas and skies. For Brazil, South Africa, India and China,
  this means an expansion in military expenditure, global peacekeeping leadership, and
  diplomatic maturity and stature. For America, this means we can stop paying to be the
  world’s cop. And we can rewrite the paragraph to read: “The solution is for America to
  gracefully turn away from military rivalry in other peoples’ regions. A more prudent
  America would guarantee security in its own region and support other regional powers in
  their parallel duties. Together, all regional powers would guarantee the peaceful conduct of
  trade and commerce on which global prosperity depends. America therefore needs to be
  strong enough to guarantee North American seas alone. If America thinks it should protect
  Taiwan, China will think it should protect Cuba.”
  Recommend (314)
  值得夸奖,《经济学人》终于以比较完整、理性、平衡的方式讲述了这个问题,而且得到了
  非常明白的结论:“把中国当做敌人,很可能中国就真得成了敌人”。
  所以我失望地发现作者在同一篇文章里又自相矛盾地说:“有人会说解决的办法是让美国放
  弃军事的对抗。但是一个削弱的美国将导致东亚局势逐渐走向紧张,进而威胁到美国的繁荣
  所依赖的和平的商业、贸易活动。美国因此需要强大得足以保证海洋安全,并能保护台湾免
  遭中国的攻击。”
  我相信爱因斯坦说过:“解决问题和提出问题,需要不同的思维”。所以要解决21世纪的中
  心问题,我们得重新思考。究竟为什么美国自认为是全世界范围内的唯一的、正直的裁决者
  来决定21世纪的安全呢?这种想法是否,从全球历史的角度上看,过于放肆呢?如果我们
  接受而且欢迎地区强国比如巴西、南非、印度、中国的繁荣昌盛,为什么我们不接受而且欢
  迎它们在地区安全上的角色呢?说实话,把南美交给正在强大的巴西去管是适当的、理性的、
  现实的。把非洲交给正在强大的南非去管是适当的、理性的、现实的。把南亚交给正在强大
  的印度去管是适当的、理性的、现实的。把东亚交给正在强大的中国去管是适当的、理性的、
  现实的。另外,把北美留给美国管是适当的、理性的、现实的。
  【译者评:英语一般不喜欢重复,但这厮为了强调,在这里用几乎完全一样的句式说了5
  次。】
  这意味着每个地区强权可以并应该保持一支远洋海军和空军,其力量与其管理地区的水域、
  空域相适应。对巴西、南非、印度、中国来说,这意味着扩大军事支出、增加国际维和领导
  权、提高外交的成熟度和地位。对美国而言,这意味着我们不再花自己的钱去扮演世界警察。
  我们可以把上面那段话改写为:“对美国而言,解决的办法是在别人的地盘上优雅地放弃军
  事对抗。一个更谨慎的美国应该保证自己地盘上的安全并支持别的地区强国执行它们的任
  务。所有的地区强国联手保证全球繁荣所依靠的贸易、商业得以和平开展。这样美国只需有
  能力保证北美海域的安全即可。如果美国觉得它应该保护台湾,中国就会认为自己应该保护
  古巴。”
  推荐(314)
  【译者评:美国的普通民众,特别是“茶党”人,都有“美国卓越论”的倾向。这厮居然把
  美国从超级大国降到了地区强国的地位,估计会被“茶党”们千刀万剐的。】
  
  
  Rafael A, wrote:
  Dec 2nd 2010 4:59 GMT
  
  I have the vague impression that the hegemonic America is afraid of something...
  Recommend (309)
  我怎么隐隐地感觉霸权主义的美国在害怕什么……
  推荐(309)
  
  
  Ed (Brazil) wrote:
  Dec 2nd 2010 5:09 GMT
  
  @ Andover Chick
  I disagree with you on Japan. How will they fight any wars without young people ? Will you
  give a rifle to an 80 years old Japanese ? Better yet, what will convince an old country like
  Japan to go to War ?
  Recommend (295)
  回复Andover Chick
  在日本问题上我不同意你。他们都没有年轻人了还打什么仗?你会把枪交给一个80岁的日
  本老头吗?进一步说,什么能促使一个像日本那样的老龄化社会去打仗?
  推荐(295)
  
  Andover Chick wrote:
  Dec 2nd 2010 5:06 GMT
  
  As China’s aging ruling regime is replaced the young then relations between China and the
  USA will certainly improve.
  Separately, China’s military worries likely would not come from the USA. What China should
  worry about is Japan. If Japan decided to rearm the it would cut thru China like a hot
  Samurai sword thru butter, even with a tenth of the population. Japan is a culture made for
  war, even if they’re peaceful now. China should think twice about irritating or tweaking the
  nose of Japan.
  Recommend (228)
  【译者注:上一篇帖子回复的就是这一篇】
  当中国的老一代领导换成年轻一代的时候,中、美之间的关系肯定会改善。
  另一方面,中国的军事顾虑似乎并不是针对美国。中国应该顾虑的是日本。如果日本决定重
  新武装自己,尽管人口只有十分之一,它切中国就像烧红的武士刀切黄油一样【利落】。就
  算他们现在很和平,但日本的文化就是为战争服务的。中国在激怒、教训日本之前应该三思。
  推荐(228)
楼主NileBlue 时间:2010-12-15 14:12:22
  Jeremy Wong Fischer wrote:
  Dec 2nd 2010 5:43 GMT
  
  I dont get it. The title completely contradicts the articles content (and even the subtitle).
  I dont really see any "dangers" listed in this article.
  Surprising balance to be found in an Economist article.
  Recommend (223)
  我不明白。文章的标题和内容自相矛盾(甚至和副标题矛盾)。
  我真地没有在文章中看到什么“危险”。
  《经济学人》的文章居然写得这么平衡,很意外呢。
  推荐(223)
  
  
  Astute Neophyte wrote:
  Dec 2nd 2010 6:56 GMT
  
  The Dangers of Rising China? Seems like a hysterical headline!!
  Sir, Which world are you living in? Is China a monster? Or Just that US (and the west) is
  afraid of loosing their global clout finally? C’mon accept the truth!
  Two questions: (Pls compare it to US later)
  1. How many wars have China waged against countries?
  2. How many civilian regimes have been subverted with the help of Chinese intelligence
  agencies?
  Yes, China has its own set of problems (as viewed by outsiders) BUT I don’t perceive any
  reason to be hysterical of Chinese rise. Paradigms of international geopolitics are now
  being written in economic and trade, rise of China and India are testimony to this fact. The
  stagnant economies consider this as a serious dent to their global prowess.
  Dynamics of global politics have changed over a period of last 200 years substantially; the
  British Empire, Rise of US post first world war, subsequent Cold-war period and finally US
  hegemony! The rules of the game are again being redrawn in 21st century and its
  imperative that the west adapt to the new reality rather than trying to cling on to
  good-olden days. Only those nations which can effective strategise and re-align
  themselves will succeed in the changed geopolitics.
  Finally, lets be fair to China. It’s not a failed or a rogue state guysl and while somebody
  might hate communism but this isn’t McArthy era either. Change is the keyword again!!
  Recommend (184)
  崛起中国的危险?好搞笑的标题!
  先生,你生活在哪个世界里啊?中国是只怪兽吗?还是美国(以及西方)害怕最终失去它们
  的全球控制?得了吧,接受现实吧!
  两个问题:(请待会与美国相比较)
  1. 中国对别国发功了多少次战争?
  2. 中国的情报机构帮助颠覆了多少个平民政权?
  是的,中国自身有很多问题(就局外者看来),但是,我想不出理由对中国的崛起大惊小怪。
  经济和贸易中写进了国际地缘政治的典型范例,中国和印度的崛起证明了这一点。那些停滞
  不前的经济体把这个看成对它们全球霸权的严峻挑战。
  过去200年里,国际政治的动力发生了根本性的转移;大英帝国、一战后美国的崛起、后
  来的冷战时期以及最后美国的一手遮天!现在,游戏的规则在21世纪再次被改写,西方应
  该接受这个新现实而不是老抱着过去的好时光不放。只有那些能够有效谋划并重新调整自己
  的国家,才能够在变化了的地缘政治中成功。
  最后,让我们对中国公平点。伙计们,它不是一个失败的国家或者流氓国家!有人可能仇视
  共产主义,但现在也不是麦卡锡时代了。这次的关键词又是:改变!
  推荐(184)
  
  
  JGradus wrote:
  Dec 2nd 2010 5:10 GMT
  
  I think the greatest threat will be the day the Party fails to provide growth for the people
  (which WILL come some day) and needs to find a different way to legitimize their rule.
  Recommend (169)
  我想最大的危险是:当党无法为老百姓提供更多的【经济】增长的那一天(总会到来的),
  然后就需要找另外的方法来为自己的统治提供合法性依据了,
  推荐(169)
  
  
  Subash S wrote:
  Dec 2nd 2010 4:57 GMT
  
  When has "History [showed] that superpowers can coexist peacefully when the rising
  power believes it can rise unhindered and the incumbent power believes that the way it
  runs the world is not fundamentally threatened"?
  First, the term superpower was not coined until the 20th century to describe Russia, the
  US and perhaps Britain. Second, the pure desire for economic superiority would drive them
  towards conflict, let alone political, ideological, nationalistic, or imperialistic reasons.
  Human nature has remained the same since the dawn of time. As long as Hobbes is right
  about it, there will always be war. "You do not understand war without peace", and vice
  versa.
  Recommend (162)
  “历史表明,当崛起的大国相信自己的崛起并没有受到阻碍的时候、当居统治地位的大国相
  信自己管理世界的方式并没有受到本质性的威胁的时候,那么超级大国是可以和平共处的。”
  几时有过这种事?
  首先,“超级大国”是20世纪才创造出来的一个词,用来描述俄国、美国,也许还有英国。
  其次,想让自己的经济压过对方,光这一点就促使它们走向冲突,更不要说政治的、意识形
  态的、民族主义的或帝国主义的原因了。
  人性自从天地初开就没有改变。只要霍布斯【译者注:英国哲学家,主张人性本恶】是对的,
  就永远会有战争。“不理解和平,就不理解战争”,反之亦然。
  推荐(162)
  
  
  enriquecost wrote:
  Dec 2nd 2010 6:35 GMT
  
  We don´t know about China´s dangers, only about America´s dangers as it has invaded
  two nations during the last decade (Iraq and Afghanistan), something the World had not
  seen since Adolf Hitler. Two nations of 30 million people have now American puppet
  Governments and their resources are under U.S. Administration. New Protectorates. And,
  at the same time, the U.S. is threatening Iran, a nation of 74 million peple with an
  extension similar to all the territories of Western and Central Europe invaded by Adolf Hitler
  decades ago.
  Recommend (154)
  我们不知道什么中国的危险,只知道美国的危险,毕竟它在这个10年里侵略了两个国家(伊
  拉克和阿富汗),这种事自从阿道夫•希特勒之后再没发生过。两个国家,3000万人,现在
  被美国的傀儡所统治,他们的资源被美国管理。新的被保护国呢【译者注:Protectorate是
  殖民时代的词,现在已很少用,可以理解为无主权的殖民地】。而且,美国同时还在威胁伊
  朗,一个7400万人口的国家,这种扩张就像是几十年前希特勒侵略西欧和中欧的领土一样。
  推荐(154)
楼主NileBlue 时间:2010-12-15 14:14:19
  vivazapata wrote:
  Dec 2nd 2010 5:56 GMT
  
  England tolerated the rise of the US in the nineteenth century. The twentieth century saw
  proof of the wisdom of this course.
  The US permitted China into the WTO. The US protectz the trade routes that have allowed
  China to become a rising economic superpower. For now, the US tolerates Chinas covert
  and overt attempts to discomfit the US.
  The US does not seek the containment of China. Rather, the US seeks to convince China
  that it should comport itself in the manner that its power and desired prestige would
  dictate. The US seeks a collegue, not an adversary.
  China is learning. It may be a democratic state in this century. It is to be ardently desired
  that China does not choose the way of force over that of gradually accumulated influence
  to find its place in the sun.
  Recommend (143)
  英国在19世纪容忍美国的崛起。这种做法的明智在20世纪得到了印证。
  美国允许中国进入WTO。美国保护中国成长为经济大国所依赖的贸易渠道。对于中国或明
  或暗地想让美国出丑的尝试,美国目前还是容忍的。
  美国不寻求遏制中国。美国宁愿试图让中国相信:它应该按照自身实力和想要达到的声望来
  约束自己的行为。
  中国在学习。在本世纪内它也许会成为一个民主国家。世人热切地希望中国不要选择武力,
  而是逐渐地累积自己的影响力,寻求在世界上的地位。
  推荐(143)
  
  Ed (Brazil) wrote:
  Dec 2nd 2010 4:41 GMT
  
  Welcome to Cold War II !
  Recommend (133)
  欢迎进入第二次冷战!
  推荐(133)
  
  
  KewZee wrote:
  Dec 2nd 2010 6:06 GMT
  
  Whats next, India? As long as there are Rising Powers that threaten Americas position in
  the world, it will be regarded as a "danger."
  Recommend (131)
  下一个是谁?印度?只要有新崛起的强国威胁到美国在世界上的地位,它就会被视作“危
  险”。
  推荐(131)
  
  
  Lafiel wrote:
  Dec 2nd 2010 6:00 GMT
  
  My greatest fear isnt war between the USA and China. It is the sudden collapse of one or
  the other. The USA for economic reasons and China for social reasons.
  Thus these reasons could cause conflicts as a group or party trys to maintain order.
  Falkland Island War comes to mind when the Junta of Argentina bet on Nationalism to keep
  them in power and ended up not only out of power but also loss of many soldiers.
  Recommend (106)
  我最害怕的不是美国和中国之间的战争。而是它们中有一个突然崩溃。美国是因为经济原因
  而中国是因为社会原因。
  而这些有可能触发冲突,因为有一方试图保持秩序。当阿根廷的军政府想保持自己的权力时,
  他们赌的是民族主义这张牌,于是就想到了福克兰群岛战争【译者注:中国一般称为“马尔
  维纳斯群岛战争”】,结果却是自己的垮台以及很多士兵的丧生。
  推荐(106)
  
  
  boombust wrote:
  Dec 2nd 2010 7:34 GMT
  
  Dear sir,
  I wish the Economist would, for once, publish an article written by somebody who has lived
  in China for at least a decade. For all the superlative narrative about Chinas threat to world
  peace, the Economist has never attempted to examine the premises of their argument
  from a Chinese perspective.
  If you study the 4000 years of history in China, with the aberration of 80 years rule by the
  Mongos, the Chinese has never taken aggression outside the bounds of their territory.
  They love infighting, however! And they glorify the rich and famous. (Hollywood is a
  child-play compared to the emperors that were worshiped by millions for hundreds of
  years)
  Long story short, Chinese are a cordial bunch and love to make money. The outward
  expression of their national pride is condemned by their traditions, but its a memory reflex
  of their recent humiliation laid upon them by the "White Ghosts" more than 100 years ago.
  I hope the Economist will refrain from their one-sided assessment of China if they are
  actually trying and/or claiming to be an incorrigible commentator on world affairs between
  China and the West.
  -Thomas
  Recommend (106)
  尊敬的【编辑】先生:
  我希望《经济学人》能够发表一篇在中国住了至少10年的人写的文章,就一篇也行。对于
  这些高高在上的、关于中国威胁世界和平的话,《经济学人》从来没有从中国人的角度来试
  着检查这些判断的前提。
  如果你研究中国4000年的历史,除了在蒙古人统治下的短短80年之外,中国人从未在他
  们的领土之外进行侵略。不过呢,他们喜欢自己人打自己人!而且他们崇拜财富和名誉。(和
  那些被几百万人崇拜了几百年的皇帝们相比,好莱坞就是小孩过家家。)
  长话短说,中国人是一群亲切的人,而且喜欢赚钱。由于他们的传统,他们不会把国家荣誉
  时刻挂在嘴边上,相反,他们表达出来的是对100多年前,那些“白鬼”们强加到他们身
  上的屈辱的记忆。
  如果你们确实试图(如你们声称的)对中国与西方之间的事务发表中立的评价,我希望《经
  济学人》能够放弃这种对中国的单方面的考察。
  —托马斯
  推荐(106)
楼主NileBlue 时间:2010-12-15 14:16:46
  OK!全部搞定了。请大家畅所欲言吧!
  \(^o^)/~
作者:jjky001 时间:2010-12-15 14:27:55
  mrk
作者:浮木于水 时间:2010-12-15 14:32:24
  看这个就感觉是在看白种杂种在YY
  
作者:sehyj 时间:2010-12-15 14:37:23
  好文章,我看到了一群自以为是世界中心的先生们的焦虑
作者:百川归入海 时间:2010-12-15 14:37:30
  哼哼!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
  戴着眼镜看中国!!!!!!!!!!
  而且还是有色的!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
作者:劈刺108 时间:2010-12-15 14:38:42
  现在的中国还不是强硬的时候,经济上严重依赖美欧,科技上与美欧也有较大差距,软实力、硬实力都远逊于人,强硬对抗是不明智的。
  
  
  
  
  
作者:丐帮苏灿 时间:2010-12-15 14:47:08
  好文
作者:司明启智 时间:2010-12-15 14:47:21
  一篇好文章.
作者:jjky001 时间:2010-12-15 14:50:34
  字里行间的西方中心论是骨子里的。
  
  白夷们历史太短,太浅薄。
作者:davidye1200 时间:2010-12-15 14:56:54
  不错,可惜没看完
作者:davidye1200 时间:2010-12-15 14:58:22
  不过他们西方人看事物总戴着有色眼镜,
  这会影响他们的判断
作者:道号无涯子 时间:2010-12-15 15:04:16
  每次看到美国学者的文章, 都会感叹悠久的历史对一个国家有多重要. 美国人本来就不聪明, 又没有历史经验可以借鉴. 结果就是其精英阶层的水准比中国JY强不了多少. 这样的国家, 不打仗要衰落, 打仗更要衰落. 一个国家的衰落是全方位的, 不论经济军事实力还是人口素质. 历史上没有一个衰落的大国, 可以通过发动战争来遏制强大的对手. 战争是一个国家的物质动员能力, 和人民精神忍耐力的全面考验. 如果能在这些方面胜过对手, 相比之下你又怎么会是"衰落"的?
作者:atheoretical 时间:2010-12-15 15:05:36
  老外与其这样忧心忡忡,不如在其内部瓦解,效果应该更好!
作者:愚人2017 时间:2010-12-15 15:10:10
  岳飞说,文官不爱钱,武官不怕死,天下太平。
作者:zhangjiayi731 时间:2010-12-15 15:22:54
  very nice,thank you LZ.
作者:dprc 时间:2010-12-15 15:36:22
  兼听则明
作者:道号无涯子 时间:2010-12-15 15:52:46
  作者:愚人2017 回复日期:2010-12-15 15:10:10 
  
    岳飞说,文官不爱钱,武官不怕死,天下太平。
  -------------------------
  
  所以天下不可能太平. 古今中外都一样.
  你爱钱不? 你怕死不? 就算你宣称自己不爱财不怕死, 天下的文武官都让你一个人包了?
作者:上酱潘凤 时间:2010-12-15 16:04:23
  哦
作者:fxfd2 时间:2010-12-15 16:04:39
  同意
  
作者:hljhrbyy 时间:2010-12-15 16:05:16
  目前还是应该继续韬光养晦,耐心等待时机的到来,对于美国这样的国家要用长远的眼光去观察,他如果有一天衰败了应该是败在他们自己的手里。一个年轻的美国就算是体格再强壮,也不要轻易的把一个历经沧桑,忍辱负重的中国想的如此简单。日(国耻制造者)俄(窃取我国土)才是我方心腹大患,希望不要让国人失望,即便有生之年见不到,我相信等到来的那一刻在天上也会笑出来的。
作者:老和尚不用飘柔 时间:2010-12-15 16:10:50
  哦
作者:615基金新兵 时间:2010-12-15 16:19:19
  
  才发现。
  尼罗兰兄弟终于出手了,早就觉得你应该干点儿什么,那么好的英文,还有那么好的知识储备,呵呵。
  
  这篇文章太有价值了,容我慢慢多看几遍。
作者:伊人不眠夜 时间:2010-12-15 16:25:25
  再现傲慢与偏见。
作者:麦克老狼MIKE 时间:2010-12-15 16:43:21
  GOOD
作者:xxj622 时间:2010-12-15 16:46:52
  好,就一个字。
作者:流氓湿人 时间:2010-12-15 16:51:45
  凭什么要我们加入西方的体系!
作者:cd_keanu 时间:2010-12-15 17:00:16
  lz,你是我的偶像!!!
作者:x19789180 时间:2010-12-15 17:08:36
  通篇 都是 别人的 视界 的 来 得出 结果 ,这样的 结果 对 解决 问题 并 没有 任
  
  何 用处 。
  
  《中国崛起的危险》 的 名字 ,其实 改成 《美国 及 中国周边国家 眼中的 中
  
  国》 更 贴切 。
  
  要是 以 中国人 看世界 ,所有 事实 相同 ,可是 意味 肯定 完全 相反。
  
  要是 以 俄罗斯人 看世界 ,只怕 事实 相同 ,可是 意味 又有 区别。
  
  要是 以 日本人 来 看世界 ,只怕 事实 相同 ,却会 得出 美国 ,中国 ,俄罗斯 都
  
  是 日本的 头号大敌。
  
  要是 以 印度人 来写 ,只怕 事实 相同,得出的 结论 又不一样。
  
  所以 ,这片 文章 ,不过 又是 中国 威胁论的 新版本 罢了。
作者:x19789180 时间:2010-12-15 17:12:17
  同样的 事实 ,不同的 人 ,不同的 国家 解读 都是 不同的。
  
  就如 美国 劈开 联合国 ,以大规模 杀伤性武器的 理由 推翻 萨达姆政权一样。
  
  美国 人 当时 以为 这是 反恐 战争 ,是 正义的。
  
  中东某些国家 ,认为 只是 强国 对 弱国 侵略。
  
  欧洲 的 一些的国家 ,认为 这 不符合 联合国宪章。
  
  俄罗斯 可能 以为 美国 是在 遏制 俄罗斯 在 中东的 势力。
  
  中国 可能 认为 在 包围 中国 ,威胁 中国的 能源 安全。
  
  ...................
作者:懒羊羊爱踢毽子 时间:2010-12-15 17:33:09
  先马克 再看~
作者:栀夏世 时间:2010-12-15 17:41:39
  关注
作者:刘梦凡 时间:2010-12-15 17:42:34
  MARK
作者:edyswghe 时间:2010-12-15 18:42:47
  极好的文章,属于西方价值体系下较为公允的作品,但丝毫没有站在中国的价值观上想问题
作者:duchaohong2008 时间:2010-12-15 20:03:09
  美国把中国当敌人,那中国就是它的敌人;如果美国把中国当朋友,那中国就是它的朋友;关系是相互的.
作者:人字拖8 时间:2010-12-15 20:07:37
  3
作者:else000000 时间:2010-12-15 20:17:31
  lz辛苦了,
  本文作者以西方人的眼光来看待中国。个人感觉很多地方透露着白人至上的感觉。让人很不爽。 我们现在还没有能力改变他们的看法。
   但是我相信不久后(感觉不出20年)以中国为中心的东亚与东南亚经济圈会比欧洲更加有活力,繁荣。那时候中国肯定是世界第一吧。到时候白人也应该不会用这种眼光看我们了。
作者:弹鸟一挥间 时间:2010-12-15 20:27:11
  
    Rafael A, wrote:
    Dec 2nd 2010 4:59 GMT
    
    I have the vague impression that the hegemonic America is afraid of something...
    Recommend (309)
    我怎么隐隐地感觉霸权主义的美国在害怕什么……
作者:strive010 时间:2010-12-15 20:36:35
  记号一下!
作者:日明2010 时间:2010-12-15 20:44:13
  ,文官不爱钱,武官不怕死,天下太平。
作者:txtpic 时间:2010-12-15 21:14:49
  我们实力现在还不够,只能遵守他们制定的规则。
  加油吧,也许我们这代人可以重新见证中国的崛起!
  真理的就是大炮的射程范围,那帮强盗的后代只知道这些
  以后我们就用实力让他们闭嘴,由我们来制定规则
作者:Air_Re 时间:2010-12-15 21:21:30
  6
作者:悬崖边的80后 时间:2010-12-15 21:30:25
  强贴要顶
作者:tywow222 时间:2010-12-15 21:47:15
  你也可以想象他们进而提出真正的问题:在没有人诉诸武力的情况下,中国能否登上世界之巅。
  -----------------------------
  英国人有意淫功夫真是一流的。
  世界之巅?像美国一样吗?然后,旧世界之巅和新世界之巅你争我斗,英国人舒舒服服地又看戏,又得好处?
  
  这种卑鄙伎俩,美国人也许会上当,中国人似乎不会。
  
  真没感觉到中国人在考虑世界之巅的问题。现在大家都在闷声发大财,管他巅不巅的啊。
作者:昆仑小草ABC 时间:2010-12-15 21:53:52
  非常感谢楼主!你让我们看到了一篇很有价值的文章。
  说它有价值并不是我会同意文章的观点,而是说文章让我了解了那些西方的白人中心主义者们是如何以一种傲慢的、居高临下的眼光来看待中国的崛起的。在他们的眼里,中国就应该永远贫穷落后,永远接受西方列强的欺负和掠夺,中国永远就只能在十二海里之内有自由,而十二海里之外就都是以美国为首的西方列强的自由!
  楼主所摘录的那些网民主流意见特别有意思。尤其那位托马斯先生说的“希望《经济学人》能够发表一篇在中国住了至少10年的人写的文章”的意见,我觉得是最中肯的!
作者:大道不工 时间:2010-12-15 21:58:24
  恩 这些白种人仍旧不了解中国
作者:梅花引咏 时间:2010-12-15 22:09:38
  文章力图很全面客观地去分析这个复杂问题,但可惜无一立论不建立在美国或其主导体系本身是正义裁决者这一隐含假设之上。仅此一点就给文章力度打了不少折扣,也削弱了其现实意义。
  
  不过也好,从这样的文章中,我们能试图从别人的角度去理解思考问题,正视别人的观点和感受。但别人却始终不能真正通晓我们观古察今的历史价值观真正所在。信息的不对称将来会决定实力的不对称。
  
  我们的历史(尤其是特有的有长期连续文字记录的历史)决定我们衡量世界的时间标准不会以一个国际秩序兴亡那短暂的几十年为坐标。华夏的复兴并不是一个新生霸权的崛起,而是一种古老文明信念在历经短暂迷惘之后向其历史本位的清醒回归和再次适应时代潮流的涅磐再生,这与当年的英美德称霸有本质的不同。说中国的复兴只是向曾羞辱过我们的对手的恐怖复仇或成为下一个国际秩序主导者或霸主,真有点“燕雀不知浩鹄之志”。
  
  感谢楼主的努力。我想这些文章会促使每个中国人更加看清自己所在的时代大特征,并清醒地反思自己所承付的历史责任所在。周虽旧邦,其命维新。
作者:华子微 时间:2010-12-15 22:12:51
  话说现在的国际规则挺好的啊,
  中国干嘛要改变国际规则啊。
  世界自由贸易,谁能争得过中国?
作者:wbfyl 时间:2010-12-15 22:20:15
  
  
  作者:道号无涯子 回复日期:2010-12-15 15:52:46 
  
    作者:愚人2017 回复日期:2010-12-15 15:10:10 
    
      岳飞说,文官不爱钱,武官不怕死,天下太平。
    -------------------------
    
    所以天下不可能太平. 古今中外都一样.
    你爱钱不? 你怕死不? 就算你宣称自己不爱财不怕死, 天下的文武官都让你一个人包了?
  -----------
  反正现在的那些JY,肯定是不符合这个标准的,以前的共产党倒是有这种精神。
作者:一张旧粮票 时间:2010-12-15 22:52:53
  好文章。
作者:键盘又烧死了 时间:2010-12-15 22:53:29
  首页马克恩
作者:~福儿~ 时间:2010-12-15 22:56:09
  楼主厉害,支持,慢慢看
作者:myones 时间:2010-12-15 23:29:39
  MARK
作者:myones 时间:2010-12-15 23:30:59
  记号
作者:虚拟人与社会 时间:2010-12-15 23:37:36
  
  想知道什么是傲慢与偏见吗?
  看看这篇文章就明白了。
  
作者:菲尔比114 时间:2010-12-15 23:43:30
  呵呵
作者:虚拟人与社会 时间:2010-12-15 23:48:30
  
  作者写这篇文章时,一定强烈认为自己是公正的化身,教导中国,甚至包括美国,应该做什么,不应该做什么......
  
  自我感觉是相当的好,呵呵。
  
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